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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Incentives, Information, and Bias
Incentives matter! This is a fundamental belief of economists. The aim of this
work is to study the design of incentives with respect to timing decisions. More
precisely, we will discuss how the frequency with which performance information
is retained—i.e. the frequency of performance evaluations—impacts incentives
and efficiency within an organization.
Understanding incentives is a major focus of economic theory. In particular,
economists are interested in the relation of incentives and efficiency, the question
whether incentives can be designed so that the outcome of economic behavior
is efficient. An important subject for such kind of investigation are incentives
provided to employees via their labor contract and these contracts’ properties
concerning efficiency. In particular, a large literature deals with contracts com-
prehending a variable compensation component which is supposed to provide
incentives by a linkage of an employee’s merit to his pay. This research is highly
relevant, as we have observed a continuous rise in the use of variable compensa-
8
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tion in the past decades.1 Hence, understanding how this development impacts
the provision of incentives in firms is an important field of economic research.
But the link between pay and performance is less obvious, one could also say
less direct, than we might expect initially. What is performance? Can it be
measured at all, and if yes, how can it be measured? The link between an em-
ployee’s job performance and his payroll consists in information. The information
used to determine to what extent an individual’s compensation depends on his
performance is pivotal, certainly for the incentives provided by variable pay!
The availability of appropriate information, i.e. an adequate measure, which
is able to capture the true value of the work accomplished by an employee differs
according to professions. For some jobs, a strong link between performance and
some quantitative measure seems natural. This is why we observe, for example,
the compensation of salesmen or executives varying largely with the amount of
products sold and the performance of the firm respectively. Both of these mea-
sures can be easily scaled and quantified by the observation of sales, and a firm’s
profit or its share price. Additionally, they seem to be highly correlated with per-
formance and, hence, linking compensation to these objective measures provides
strong incentives to employees in these particular professions.
However, the relation between performance itself and performance measures
is not always so close. Taking the production process as an example, the number
of items produced could be taken as a measure for a worker’s performance. Still,
performance is not only reflected by the number of items produced but as well
by the quality of these products. Furthermore, one would expect that it plays a
role for performance whether a worker correctly maintains his workplace, whether
he helps to enhance the production process, and so forth. If now, the employer
1For example, Parviainen (2003) reports for Finnish industrial firms that the share of blue-
collar workers being paid for performance rose from 12.4 to 26.3 percent between 1996 and
2000. The respective share of white-collar workers increased from 28.7 to 37.2 percent in this
period. Also, Kurdelbusch (2002) states a rise of variable pay in large German companies since
the end of the nineties. This can be seen as the arrival of a trend from Anglo-Saxon countries
such as it has been identified in Lebow et al. (1999).
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decides to pay this worker only on the basis of the number of produced items, this
can lead to a severe distortion of incentives. Performance pay might significantly
raise output, but it is quite likely that the worker will at the same time spend less
time with quality assurance, maintenance, and process optimization. Activities
that he is not rewarded for might be cut back to a detrimental extent, potentially
lowering the worker’s overall performance instead of boosting it by the recently
set incentive pay.
One way to avoid negative effects of distorted incentives based on objective
but insufficient measures is to include a subjective component when it comes
to the determination of variable pay, e.g. of the amount of a bonus. A lead
worker can be additionally assigned the role of supervising the co-workers at his
assembly line. When the decision on the amount of the workers’ bonus is taken,
it can be discussed with this supervisor whether additional ”soft” criteria besides
increasing production volume have been responsibly respected by the workers.
Only when this is the case, the full bonus will be paid.
The more complex the task of an employee is, the more difficult it becomes to
find appropriate objective measures for performance. One response to that can
be to pay a straight salary instead. Another one is to organize a well-managed
evaluation process in which employee performance will be approximated by gathe-
ring objective measures as well as subjective measures provided by a supervisor or
superior who has good insight into the particular employee’s work. However, an
inherent problem of the use of subjective measures in an evaluation procedure is
that they are not contractible and, therefore, the employment relationship must
be subject to a certain amount of trust.
So, when an employee’s compensation is made contingent on measures that
cannot be included in a binding contract, the incentive effect of such a compen-
sation formula crucially depends on the trust between employer and employee,
in particular on the employer’s reputation concerning the payment of promised
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bonuses. Another factor that will play a role for incentive provision is the correct-
ness of the information gathered by the means of a subjective evaluation process.
Beyond an intentional falsification of the subjective evaluation, a superior might
simply make mistakes in his judgments of an employee and, hence, wrongfully
lower the agreed bonus. If such behavior is anticipated by an employee, his mo-
tivation through variable compensation can be dramatically weakened.
One can think of numerous sources of subjectivity bias in the judgment of a
supervisor when this judgment is not based on openly observable and verifiable
measures. The bias could be caused by a framing effect, i.e. the judgment will be
influenced by former judgments that have been made in prior evaluations. Emo-
tions play an important role in judgments, even when intentional falsifications
are omitted. This work will refer to a quite omnipresent human imperfection as
a source of supervisor bias, namely the bounded capacity of human memory. As
memory decreases over time, the frequency with which employee evaluations are
conducted has an impact on the quality of the underlying information.
Employee evaluations are widely practiced in large firms. And their impor-
tance and frequency is rising continuously.2 Most of the time, they consist in
annual meetings between a superior and his subordinate. In some firms, review
meetings take place at a bi-annual rate, or even more often. For example, many
consultancies evaluate their consultants’ performance at the end of each project
completed, and this is done in addition to regular bi-annual reviews. Often, the
companies commit to the conduct of periodical evaluations by anchoring them in
their internal guidelines. Thus, the frequency of evaluations is generally some-
thing employees know in advance and can hence adapt to.
2A 2005 survey entitled Under the microscope—staff appraisal frequency on the increase
(2005) of the IRS Employment Review states that in 2005 over 50 percent of employers carry
out performance appraisal at least at an annual frequency, over a third evaluates at a six-
monthly rate. In 2003, annual reviews were conducted by 70 percent and bi-annual rates were
practiced by less than 20 percent of the surveyed firms.
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Using economic modeling techniques, this work is a primary investigation of
the role that the frequency of performance evaluations plays in incentive con-
tracting. We approach the topic assuming a supervisor whose judgment is biased
by imperfect memory. In our theoretical model, supervisors—even if they are aim-
ing at truthful and correct evaluations—only have a bounded capacity to handle
the information necessary for the evaluation process. The longer the period be-
tween the performance itself and the judgment of its value, the less likely is the
supervisor to correctly remember the real value of an employee’s work. Hence,
this bias is likely to weaken incentives and the employer can choose a higher fre-
quency of performance evaluations to counterbalance the loss of information on
behalf of the supervisor.
Technically, the assumption that the probability of forgetting information
increases over time corresponds to a depreciation of information, attaching a
higher weight to more recent information than to prior. Explaining this kind of
bias by a memory imperfection is only one possibility. One can also argue that a
decision maker correctly remembers all information, which has been gathered in
the past, and his bias consists in an over-emphasis of more recent information.3
In this case, the bias is not generated by imperfect memory but is leads to the
same biased evaluation result. The interpretation of the bias considered in this
thesis will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
When asking professionals about their perception of performance evaluations,
one will frequently hear them complain about how time-consuming the entire
evaluation process is. In our analysis, this feature is captured in a cost coming
along with each evaluation that is conducted. So all together, more frequent
evaluations offer a benefit by enhancing the quality of information used for the
determination of incentive payments but they are costly at the same time. In the
following chapters, we will use this particular framework to analyze the interplay
3This kind of bias can, for instance, be relevant for investor behavior. A biased investor will
overly weight recent investment signals.
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between an employee’s attitude towards risk and the frequency of evaluations, as
well as the impact of heterogeneity of both, supervisors and employees.
1.2 Frequency Matters!
Before we go deeper into the analysis of the setup described beforehand, we
will shortly discuss some examples which illustrate that frequency matters in the
process of performance evaluation.
The Right to Evaluation
Periodical evaluations are prevalent for jobs where performance is mainly reflected
by qualitative attributes. Middle-management positions such as business analysts
and accountants, but also engineers are good examples. These employees can
only be assessed by a person who has sufficient insight into the profession and the
specific task they are working on. Especially in larger companies, the information
gathered in the evaluations is not only of particular interest for the determination
of the next bonus payment. It is also crucial for the employee when he wants to
change his position in the firm or when his superior is likely to change his job.
One example is a large German chemical company which attributes to her middle
managers the right to be evaluated at a bi-annual rate. Employees can choose
whether they wish to be evaluated at the maximal (bi-annual) frequency or only
at an annual rate. In particular, the more frequent fluctuations are, the higher
the interest on the employee side for performance information to be properly
documented. Additionally, well-documented positive performance information
can serve as an insurance against a negative reference when the employment
relationship is terminated due to a conflict. And even more, the employee can
dispose over the information fixed in the evaluation to use it as a reference when
searching for a new job—inside and outside the firm!
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What we really find striking in this example is that evaluations serve em-
ployees and not only employers. They can be seen as a boost to an employee’s
position, who at first sight is only a number in a large corporation. To firms,
more evaluations are first of all costly, but the lesser evil when incentives are
weakened by infrequent evaluations. To—well performing—employees (and this
can be seen as a further incentive) performance evaluations are crucial, not only
in determining current pay but also future career options. When employees are
not used to it, the first reaction to performance evaluations generally is a rejecting
one. It is associated with pressure and surveillance. But in the example above,
as well as in our analysis, frequent evaluations can be advantageous rather to
employees than to firms, who wish to avoid too frequent evaluations to save cost.
Evaluations and Goal Setting
Especially for sales staff, meetings defining current sales targets take place at
a high rate. Weekly updates are not unusual. While these meetings are not
performance evaluations themselves, they show that in some circumstances the
regular update of information in response to the changes in external factors, e.g.
the market situation, is crucial. If, for instance, market activity cools down due
to an unexpected event and sales targets are not adjusted at a frequent rate, this
creates a bias of the retained performance information and weakens incentives.
Abstracting from a sales context, it is plausible to believe that external factors
influencing the performance of employees will be taken into account with more
precision if employees are evaluated more often. This could also be a reasonable
explanation, why investment bankers are evaluated on a quarterly basis whereas
lawyers’ evaluations are rather rare.4 The investment banker’s exposure to exter-
nal risk, i.e. his dependency on stock market performance, is much stronger than
that of a lawyer.
4This example is taken from Lazear (1990).
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Evaluations in an Educational Context
In education, the evaluation of school achievements is documented by report
cards, who are themselves an aggregation of different marks assigned to former
achievements. One would expect that more observations, i.e. tests, written exa-
minations, or homework, included in the determination of a particular mark,
should give a more precise description of the actual level a pupil has in the cor-
responding school subject and this mark will be perceived as fairer.
But not only the number of observations will be important for the quality
of performance information in education. Let us consider an evident example,
namely evaluations in the context of doctoral studies. The German system of
doctoral studies is presently subject to an important change. Most doctoral
students used to be employed at the chair of their advisor but recently more and
more applicants choose to join doctoral or so-called graduate schools to obtain
a doctoral degree. An important difference between the two systems of doctoral
formation is the frequency with which research findings are presented to the
advisor of the thesis and to other researchers. Regular research workshops taking
place at the doctoral schools are one important difference of the new system
compared to an employment relationship between the professor and the Ph.D.
student. This is regarded as a means to accelerate and improve Ph.D. studies.
Another distinguishing feature of the new practice is the information provided to
the student through the regular workshops. It will play a major role in his or her
future behavior whether the research paper has been approved of or not as this
information directly impacts his further research strategy.5
5We will consider further details of this example in Section 3.5 and in the conclusion.
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1.3 Main Results
In the simplest setup of our model (Chapter 3), i.e. when supervisors cannot re-
tain information perfectly over time and employees are risk-neutral, we find that
supervisors will not evaluate their subordinates more frequently to counterba-
lance forgetfulness. Although, the quality of performance information depends
on evaluation frequency, this does not automatically create a trade-off between
evaluation and incentive cost. Rather, the additional risk caused by the loss of
information due to imperfect memory will be entirely shifted to the employee via
a negative fixed compensation and incentives are strengthened by the means of
high bonus payments.
The above-mentioned trade-off is created as soon as we consider workers or em-
ployees whose wealth is limited and who at the same time cannot borrow money.
Such a binding wealth-constraint restricts the extent to which an employer can
make use of negative fixed compensation for the sake of higher incentives. If in
this case, incentives for early periods become too expensive, the employer will
prefer to augment the number of evaluations. In the first instance, this reduces
his incentive cost but also the surplus at stake will be lowered due to increased
evaluation cost. A similar trade-off occurs when the subordinates are assumed to
be risk-averse (Chapter 4). Depending on the cost of an additional evaluation, it
might be worthwhile to increase evaluations as this allows the employer to lower
variable compensation. By absorbing the effect of the memory imperfection, more
evaluations eliminate the efficiency loss due to the risk imposed on the agent.
Extending the model with risk aversion to a duopoly setup with heterogenous
employers (Chapter 5) does not change the decision on the evaluation frequency.
Only, an employer who has a better memory capacity might have an advantage
over his competitor. Since the distribution of market power does not affect the
chosen evaluation frequency, efficiency is not affected by the introduction of a
duopoly framework.
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When employees are heterogenous with respect to productivity (Chapter 6),
we find that the choice regarding the optimal evaluation frequency is independent
of the specific productivity level if information is symmetric. In contrast to our
simple model with risk-neutral employees, we find a trade-off between evaluation
cost and the quality of performance information induced by the different cost
function for effort, which is quadratic and not linear. Furthermore, we find that
sorting the workers can be worthwhile if the firm is imperfectly informed about
the employees’ productivity.
1.4 Structure
Chapter 2 anchors this work in the relevant literature on contract theory, incentive
provision, and performance evaluations. A simple model of an evaluation process
with bounded memory and extensions to limited liability and depreciation of
output will be presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 extends the setup by considering
employees who are averse to risk. Subsequently, Chapter 5 introduces a first
source of heterogeneity by dealing with supervisors who differ in their memory
capacity. Chapter 6 transfers the heterogeneity from the side of the supervisor
to those being supervised. Whereas in Chapter 5 heterogeneity is an observable
feature of the supervisors, now asymmetric information is added. The employer
knows that there are two types of employees or workers, but he cannot tell which
type he actually faces. The thesis concludes in Chapter 7 with a summary of the
main insights, a discussion of the results, and areas for future research.
Chapter 2
Literature
In this chapter, we discuss different strands of literature which are particularly
relevant for the models developed in Chapters 3 to 6. Whereas Sections 2.1 and 2.2
give an overview of this literature, Section 2.3 highlights the main connections
between the present work and the literature cited beforehand and points out
further contributions playing an important role in the present work.
2.1 Contract Theory
With the introduction of a framework for the analysis of decision making under
uncertainty (von Neumann and Morgenstern; 1944) the analysis of risk and risk
sharing began to play a major role in the economic research of the 1950s. During
the following two decades, the so-called theory of incentives and the economics
of information emerged. A main driving force of the progress in both of these
fields was to provide a formal framework for a theory of economic institutions
such as the firm (Bolton and Dewatripont; 2005, chap. 1). So to speak, they were
important contributions to the theory of the firm (for an overview see Holmstrom
and Tirole; 1989) which had been initiated by the seminal article of Coase (1937).
The strong link between the theory of the firm and what we call contract theory
18
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today manifests in the interpretation of the firm as a nexus of contracts (Alchian
and Demsetz; 1972; Jensen and Meckling; 1976). By the 1990s, this strand of
economic research had moved away from the question why an institution such as
the firm exists towards a deeper understanding of how such economic institutions
work, i.e. an additional theory of organizations emerged. This is one explanation
why the theory of information, incentives, and economic institutions nowadays is
generally referred to as contract theory (Bolton and Dewatripont; 2005, chap. 1).
2.1.1 Adverse Selection
The pioneering innovation of the theory of information was to incorporate the
informational structure—the question who knows what at which point in time—
in economic research. The focus of this strand of literature is to analyze how
changes in this informational structure affect the outcome of economic interaction.
A pioneering work in information economics is Akerlof (1970). In his paper on the
lemons market, he illustrates how an informational asymmetry between buyers
and sellers on a particular market could, in a fully competitive situation, lead
to market failure. The general problem he deals with is referred to as adverse
selection. One party in the market (in Akerlof’s case this is the seller of a used car)
is better informed than the second party (the buyer of the car), hence, the better
informed party has some private or hidden information at her disposal. There
are two types of economic models that deal with adverse selection, screening and
signaling models (see Riley; 2001, for a survey). In both types of models, the
asymmetric information is generally caused by an unobservable heterogeneity on
one side of the market. In Akerlof’s model, there are different types of sellers,
some selling good, some of them bad quality. Spence (1973) proposes a model
of imperfect information in the labor market where potential employees differ
in their productivity. In the case of screening, the incompletely informed party
first proposes a contract followed by acceptance or rejection by the party holding
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private information. In turn, signaling refers to a situation where the first party
to act is the one with private information.
Many screening models deal with the design of contracts offered by an imper-
fectly informed monopolist (Vickrey; 1961; Mirrlees; 1971). As some attributes
of the party he wants to contract with are unobservable, the monopolist offers a
range of contracts designated to each possible type of contractual partner. If the
informed party chooses the ’right’ contract, i.e. the contract particularly designed
for this type, the monopolist is able to screen the agents. With only two types of
privately informed individuals, it is a general result that the contract for the fa-
vored type is efficient and this type can extract a positive rent from the contract.
The contract for the less favored type is inefficient and he gets a utility of zero
(Salanie´; 1997, p. 25-26). The existence of screening equilibria in a competitive
market has been studied by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In their study of
insurance markets, they find that an insurer will always screen individuals with
different inherent risks and a screening contract only gives complete insurance to
individuals with high risk.
In the case of asymmetric information and signaling, the informed party moves
first. Signaling is a rational behavior if some of the informed individuals can reveal
their private information using a signal. For this signal to be significant, the cost
of the signaling activity must be correlated with the type of the individual, such
that it is only profitable for a particular type to invest into this particular signal.
Referring to a labor market context, the seminal paper by Spence (1973) analyzes
under which circumstances an informed job candidate can reveal information on
his productivity using his education as a signal.
2.1.2 Moral Hazard
Adverse selection refers to an ex ante informational asymmetry occurring be-
fore parties decide about prices and quantities traded, i.e. before they conclude
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a contract. In another well studied class of economic problems, asymmetric in-
formation arises only after parties have settled a contract and generally concerns
information about the action taken by one party. This hidden action accruing
ex post is referred to as moral hazard in the economic literature. An important
issue for the study of moral hazard is delegation. Stockholders delegate the ad-
ministration of firms to managers, citizens delegate governance to politicians, or
employers delegate daily business to employees. The delegates, or agents, are
generally better informed than the instructing party (principals) when making
decisions in place of their principals. Hence, the latter cannot conclude which
actions have been taken if his only observation is the outcome generated by the
agent. In general, this kind of asymmetric information is unfavorable for princi-
pals as agents can exploit their additional knowledge for their own benefit, e.g.
by accomplishing the delegated task with less care.
The common framework in which delegations are analyzed in economic re-
search is the so-called principal-agent model (a methodological survey can be
found in Laffont and Martimort; 2002). Salanie´ (1997) points out the following
major elements of moral hazard in an agency-model. The principal’s utility is
affected by the agent’s action, of which only an imperfect signal can be observed.
Furthermore, the action the agent chooses ”spontaneously” is not Pareto-optimal,
reflecting that ”the objectives of the parties differ” (Salanie´; 1997, p. 108). To
study the impact of imperfect information in this setup, the case of full infor-
mation serves as a bench mark. When the principal can observe the action of
the agent—and not only a stochastic outcome depending on the agent’s action as
well as a random variable—an efficient, that is a first-best contract, can be im-
plemented. The principal conditions the remuneration of the agent on the action,
which the latter will choose optimally. In this case the surplus, the economic gain
of both parties taken together, will be maximal.
When dealing with an unobservable action of the agent, the principal can only
condition the contract on the outcome, not on the action taken by the agent.
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If the agent is risk-neutral, he will ”sell” the firm to the agent in an optimal
contract. Hence, the agent pays the principal a fix premium and becomes the
residual claimant for all benefits arising.
Though it is reasonable to assume that the outcome is correlated with the
agent’s action, it is still subject to environmental influences and hence stochastic.
Therefore, a contract based on the outcome makes the agent’s earnings from the
contract risky. When the agent is risk-averse, this fact creates what is referred to
as the trade-off between risk and incentives in the literature (this trade-off and
its empirical implications have been extensively discussed by Prendergast; 2000,
2002a,b). From the point of view of optimal insurance, a risk-neutral principal
should give full insurance to the risk-averse agent by agreeing on the payment of a
fixed amount in the contract. But due to imperfect information, this would induce
the agent to make a choice which is not in line with the principal’s objectives. So,
to align incentives, the agent’s remuneration must depend on outcome as well.
The stronger it depends on this stochastic measure, or the stronger the incentives
set by the contract are, the more costly it becomes for the principal to compensate
the risk inherent to the contract. It is a general result, that contracting in the
presence of moral hazard can only be second-best efficient when the agent is
risk-averse. The magnitude of incentives—this is what determines the agent’s
exposure to risk—will in equilibrium be buffered according to his degree of risk
aversion. Full insurance will not arise in a second-best contract.
A further aspect that is important for the efficiency of contracting in the
presence of moral hazard is the wealthiness of the agent. The simple solution to
sell him the firm and hence to make him residual claimant of his actions is only
possible if the agent is sufficiently wealthy to buy. If he is not and if his access
to capital is limited, the outcome of the contractual agreement cannot be more
than second-best. Analogously to inefficiency rising with stronger risk aversion
on the part of the agent, the efficiency loss also tends to be aggravated the lower
the agent’s wealth is (see e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont; 2005, p. 168).
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James A. Mirrlees authored several early contributions to optimal contract de-
sign with moral hazard (Mirrlees; 1974, 1975, 1976). Further pioneering papers
in a principal-agent setup are Ross (1973), Harris and Raviv (1979), Holmstrom
(1979), Shavell (1979), and Grossman and Hart (1983).1 The papers cited be-
forehand do not assign a particular form to the contract offered by the principal.
In practice, it is quite common that the principal pays the agent a fixed premium
plus a bonus depending on the outcome. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have
made an attempt to rationalize such linear contracts, though they find that very
strong assumptions must hold for them to be optimal. Still, the wide use of linear
contracts and their convenience for economic modeling make them a popular field
of study within contract theory. A good example is the work on piece-rate pay
which we will discuss in Section 2.2.2.
2.1.3 Economic Contracts: Definition and Distinctions
In economic theory, what is referred to as a contract is a wide range of agree-
ments. Schweizer (1999) describes these agreements as a much broader concept
than only the contract in a legal sense. Rather, economic contracts include all
institutional precautions defining, influencing, and coordinating the strategic be-
havior of interacting parties (Schweizer; 1999, p. 5).
An essential distinction within economic contracts is the one of complete and
incomplete contracts. For a contract to be incomplete, Tirole (1999, pp. 743)
identifies three potential conditions: unforeseen contingencies, the cost of writing
contracts, and the cost of enforcing contracts. When one or several of these con-
ditions apply to a contract, it is said to be incomplete, otherwise it is complete.
Some major contributions especially discussing the role of property rights when
contracts are incomplete are Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990),
1An important concept introduced in the papers by Shavell and Holmstrom is the infor-
mativeness principle which stipulates that a contract should optimally include all available
information on the agent’s action.
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and Hart (1995). In particular, they analyze under which circumstances owner-
ship is an appropriate way to overcome opportunistic behavior on behalf of the
contracting parties caused by contractual incompleteness.
The verifiability of the information the contract refers to plays an important
role for the economic analysis of contracts. First, the more difficult it is to
verify this information, the larger the cost of enforcing the contract. Second,
it is also plausible to think of situations where it becomes so difficult to verify
the information that the respective cost is prohibitive. Basically, this results
in the information being unverifiable. Such a contract, containing unverifiable
information, is referred to as an implicit contract. In contrast, we speak of an
explicit contract if the information used in the contract can be verified by an
institution which has the power to enforce the contract in case of an infringement
or a disagreement on the terms of the contract. Most contracts the economic
literature deals with are explicit. This is obvious as the incentives to stick to an
explicit contract are guaranteed by the enforcing institution. In contrast, in an
implicit agreement the contracting parties can decide on common terms, but they
know that this accord will not be protected by the threat of a legal dispute that
puts through the terms initially agreed. Hence, an incomplete contract seems to
be a fragile construct and one would expect not to observe individuals to agree
on using such contracts as it is not credible that they will stick to them. But this
is not always true. Especially in labor contracts, implicit agreements between
employers and employees are quite common. Even though explicit contracts
dominate the economic discussion, the analysis of implicit contracts has attracted
more attention since its emergence at the end of the 1970s.
The term ’implicit contract’ goes back to Azariadis (1975); synonymously, the
term relational contract is used. A distinctive characteristic of implicit contracts
is that parties are normally not willing to stick to them in a one-shot interaction
as the terms of the contract are not enforceable. This might change when the
duration of a relationship is open-ended. If the economic surplus generated by a
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continued compliance of all parties to the contract is sufficiently high, the par-
ties will stick to it, even if there is no institution guaranteeing enforcement. In
this case, the termination of the contractual relationship, or a contractual pause
for several periods of time whenever an infringement of the contract occurs, is a
sufficient threat of punishment motivating the parties to adhere to the implicit
contract. The value of the surplus from future contracting being sufficiently high,
the implicit contract is self-enforcing, i.e. no third party is needed to assure com-
pliance. So, in this situation, the parties are able to build up a reputation of
compliance to the implicit contract and, hence, they can trust each other. The
game-theoretic concepts allowing to prove the existence of such self-enforcing im-
plicit contracts are the so-called Folk Theorems (e.g. Friedman; 1971; Rubinstein;
1979).
Klein and Leﬄer (1981) particularly discuss implicit contracts in the con-
text of product quality on a goods market. If market prize sufficiently exceeds
marginal cost, an implicit agreement concerning the level of quality will be self-
enforcing, even when the quality of goods is assumed to be unverifiable ex post.
The papers by Bull (1987) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) are important
contributions to the analysis of implicit contracts in labor markets. Bull shows
that not market reputation but an employer’s intra-firm reputation is the key for
the existence of self-enforcing termination contracts assuring an efficient level of
effort. In a certain sense, MacLeod and Malcomson approach the subject in a
more general manner showing that implicit contracts can consist of various agree-
ments, e.g. of piece-rate or bonus contracts, and are not restricted to termination
contracts, where a high wage is payed as long as employees exert sufficient effort
and otherwise the contract is terminated. Furthermore, a rigorous study of im-
plicit contracting under moral hazard and asymmetric information can be found
in Levin (2003).
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2.2 Contract Theory and Incentive Provision
An important application for contract theory is the design of incentives in firms
(see Prendergast; 1999, for a comprehensive overview on this subject). Monetary
employee incentives are generally determined by the choice of compensation con-
tracts which can for example comprise a fixed compensation, pay for performance,
or both.
2.2.1 Fixed Compensation
A quite common compensation scheme is to pay the employee a fixed salary,
independent of the output being produced. The seminal paper by Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) shows why this type of contract, even if there is no direct link
between compensation and output, provides incentives for workers to exert some
positive effort level. The rational is the following. In this model employees are
being paid above their marginal productivity. Their effort level cannot be ob-
served but with a positive probability monitoring will discover when an employee
has shirked, i.e. when he has fallen short of a minimal effort level. He will be
fired in case of insufficient effort exertion. The more the wage exceeds the agent’s
marginal productivity, being fired becomes a stronger punishment for him. He
will hence have an incentive not to undercut the minimal effort level to avoid
being fired. Though, this kind of fixed-wage contract, referred to as efficiency
wage in the literature, does not directly link pay to performance, it clearly sets
some incentives by the threat of dismissal.
Fixed salaries are generally paid in return to a given number of hours worked.
Thus, a fixed-wage compensation scheme compensates employees according to
their input measured in hours. The salary also happens to vary with the hours
worked, e.g. if overtime work is paid or working hours are flexible to some extent.
Still, this can be considered as a fixed-wage compensation scheme in a narrow
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sense as long as the hourly wage is constant. What is generally referred to as
variable compensation varies with output not input. We will discuss the effects
of compensation being linked to output in the following section.
2.2.2 Pay for Performance
Whereas a salary compensates a worker for the provided input, compensation
solely based on output is called a piece rate. The introduction of an efficient piece-
rate incentive scheme usually has two major effects. It strengthens the incentives
of the employees remaining with the firm, but it also induces a selection effect.
Less productive employees might choose to quit the current employer in search
of a firm paying a straight salary, while more productive employees on the labor
market are attracted as they expect to be paid more via piece rates than under
a fixed wage schedule. Lazear (2000) quantifies both effects using data from a
large auto glass company switching from hourly wages to piece rates.
A theoretical analysis of the impact of piece rates on the incentives of the ex-
isting workforce of a firm, their effect on employee retention and on hiring options
can be found in Lazear (1986). The paper identifies several factors favoring com-
pensation by piece rates over paying a straight salary. When a firm’s workforce
is rather heterogenous with respect to ability a differentiation of compensation
according to the generated output will provide incentives at a lower cost than
a straight salary. In other words, when a worker’s reservation wage sufficiently
exceeds the average output at his current firm, he can only be efficiently retained
by paying him a piece rate. Of course, this holds only if paying a salary means
paying the same amount to all workers doing the same job for the same number
of hours.
According to Lazear, two further determinants for the choice of the compen-
sation scheme are the cost of measuring output and the accuracy of performance
measurement. If it is difficult to provide a significant measure of individual out-
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put at a reasonable price, paying a piece rate will either provide low or wrong
incentives, or it comes at a high cost. So, the option to pay a straight salary
should be considered. In the following section we will further discuss characteris-
tics of performance measures and in how far they impact efficient incentive design
when used in performance evaluations.
2.2.3 Performance Measures and Evaluations
Paying for performance needs adequate performance information. A means to
form the link between actual performance and the corresponding compensation
is to evaluate the employee. Especially in larger firms, performance appraisals or
evaluations are practiced at a regular rate. These evaluations have a number of
different functions (Backes-Gellner et al.; 2001). The evaluations can simply serve
to determine the competencies of the workforce, e.g. by testing the intelligence
quotient. Subsequently, such tests can be used to support decisions of promotion
or dismissal. Evaluations also allow to give feedback to employees so as to enable
them to adapt future behavior correspondingly. Last but not least, evaluations
also serve as a motivation device by determining monetary incentives. They can
do so in two ways, which are rather similar when contracts are self-enforcing. On
the one hand, using the information revealed in the evaluation, one can adapt
current pay to past performance, i.e. give a wage raise for good performance
or cut wages if poor performance is stated. On the other hand, the amount of a
variable compensation component can be determined by considering which values
the underlying performance measures have taken in the evaluation.
Performance evaluation and performance measurement are highly related is-
sues. The measures themselves are useless if they are not linked to decisions
determined in the evaluation. So the evaluation itself is a measurement in a
certain sense. Backes-Gellner et al. demonstrate this fact with the following
example (Backes-Gellner et al.; 2001, p. 540): if workers are paid according to
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individual output, the latter must be measured beforehand. As it determines
the worker’s wage, the measurement itself is an evaluation of the particular em-
ployee’s performance. At a regular rate, the worker is evaluated using the retained
number of items produced by him and this results in a contingent payment. But
one could also base the payment of the worker on overall production divided by
the number of employees participating in the production process. This would
avoid the measurement of individual output, but linking pay to aggregate output
surely weakens the individual worker’s incentives. So even though the measures
for performance are available, paying piece rates will only motivate employees to
perform if their individual performance is assessed in an evaluation. Hence, there
cannot be performance pay without performance evaluation.
In the accounting literature there is a strong focus on performance measure-
ment, discussing how different characteristics of performance measures used in
evaluations affect incentives. This literature distinguishes between objective and
subjective performance measures.
Objective Performance Measures
As we have already mentioned in Section 2.1.3, the verifiability of information
contained in a contract matters. An objective performance measure can be veri-
fied unambiguously by a court when it comes to a legal dispute about the com-
pensation to be paid to an employee. Hence, such a measure allows to base an
explicit contract on it. Good examples for objective performance measures are
the number of newly canvassed customers, earnings before interest and tax, or
quarterly sales.
Objectivity of a performance measure does not ensure that the measure in
question is a good measure of an employee’s actual performance. Technically
spoken, the higher the correlation between the value he generates and the perfor-
mance measure the higher the quality of the performance measure. If a perfor-
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mance measure is not only affected by the actions and decisions of the employee
whose pay is tied to the measure, but also varies with factors the particular
employee cannot influence, this exposes him to a risk he must be compensated
for. This is the fundamental inefficiency in principal-agency relations described
by Holmstrom (1979) and others (Section 2.1.2 addresses this issue in a more
detailed way).
Another important characteristic of a performance measure is whether it can
be manipulated, i.e. whether the employee can boost the measure by actions that
do not necessarily create additional value for the firm. This can be illustrated
by considering the use of profit as a performance measure. If the manager of a
production plant is paid according to profit, he has a large number of means to
augment this measure. While the firm is interested in long-term profitability, the
manager might choose to omit important investments at the production site in
order to be paid a higher bonus in the short term. Usually, the firm will have
a longer time horizon than its employees, and hence, sustainable profitability
is not ensured by linking pay to current profitability. A theoretical analysis of
incentive contracts that are tied to an inefficient, i.e. a distorted performance
measure, is provided in Baker (1992). It turns out that efficiency depends on the
statistical relationship between the underlying objective of the employer and the
performance measure used in the contract.
This is also true in practice. What you pay for is what you get! Employers
introducing a variable compensation contingent on a distorted performance mea-
sure risk making harsh experiences. High values of the performance measure
might be realized to the detriment of the firm or of customers. A well-known
example for this effect is the introduction of piece rates at Sears’ auto repair
centers, which resulted in a substantial reduction of the firm’s value (Patterson;
1992). A short description of the case can be found in Baker (2000, p. 416.).
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Subjective Performance Measures
In order to avoid counterproductive or suboptimal behavior objective measures
are frequently combined with or even replaced by subjective measures. Calling
in a supervisor to provide his personal judgment allows to filter out some risk
imposed by objective measures, it reduces distortion, and constitutes a means to
investigate whether there has been ”gaming” of objective performance measures.
The judgment of the superior being unverifiable, an incentive contract based on
subjective performance measures is implicit, entailing the problems we have al-
ready discussed with respect to implicit contracts in general in Section 2.1.3.
Therefore, the existence of a sufficient amount of trust between the contracting
parties is crucial for the functioning of incentive schemes based on subjective
measures (see e.g. Harbring; 2007, for an experimental study on the role of trust
and cooperation in organizations). Recent empirical evidence in Gibbs et al.
(2004) supports this by showing that the positive impact of subjective evalua-
tions on productivity, profit, and employee satisfaction increase in tenure of the
supervised.
It is often argued that only weak monetary incentives are tied to the outcome
of subjective evaluations. But one should not forget that variable compensation
at the end of an evaluation period can be chosen equivalently to the expected
discounted gain from promotion due to a good performance in the past evaluation
period, the timing of the payment being irrelevant. So, monetary incentives are
still at work if promotion decisions coming along with a wage raise are influenced
by evaluation outcomes.
Objective and Subjective Performance Measures
Baker et al. (1994) have formally studied the interplay between the use of sub-
jective and objective performance measures and find that the simultaneous use
of both, implicit and explicit incentives, can be optimal. Related to this work is
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a paper by Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995) who extend MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989) to a setup with implicit and explicit contracts at work. In line with Baker
et al. (1994), they show that an objective measure which is close to perfect may
destroy the possibility to contract on a perfect subjective measure. So, to be able
to use subjective measures in performance evaluations, the objective measures at
hand must be sufficiently imperfect. Further work focussing on the interaction
of implicit and explicit incentives in a principal-agent model is Pearce and Stac-
chetti (1998). When some actions of the agent are non-verifiable, rewards based
on an implicit contract can smooth the agent’s consumption and, hence, alleviate
the risk imposed on the agent.
Budde (2006) can show in an extension of Baker et al. (1994) that implicit and
explicit contracts are in fact complementary, no matter what is the principal’s
fallback position. The balanced scorecard, a concept going back to Kaplan and
Norton (1992), underpins the practical relevance of this result. Nowadays, it has
become a popular management tool that implements the combination of objective
as well as subjective performance measures to support operative control and
incentive provision in firms.2
Subjective Performance Evaluations and Bias
Beyond issues concerning the reputation of an employer, the use of subjective
performance measures comes along with some more inconveniences, namely the
discretionary character of subjective evaluation methods and the bias of measure-
ment they might entail. Prendergast and Topel (1993) discuss different types of
bias that can influence the subjective judgment of a supervisor. For example,
there is evidence that supervisors give higher ratings to subordinates of their own
2It has to be mentioned, that the use of scorecards for incentive provision is also subject
to criticism. Lipe and Salterio (2000) as well as Ittner et al. (2003) find that superiors tend
to attach too much weight to objective measures within a scorecard. Furthermore, Moers
(2005) gives empirical evidence from a one-firm sample that indicates bias in evaluations being
reinforced by performance measure diversity and subjectivity.
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race. Also, personal affection of a supervisor might lead to better ratings of fa-
vorites (this situation has been modeled in Prendergast and Topel; 1996). The
mere existence of favoritism naturally leads to influence activities designated to
win the favor of the supervisor, creating incentives to invest effort in activities
that—at least most of the time—do not serve the objective of the organization.
A further important contribution to the study of bias in subjective perfor-
mance evaluations is MacLeod (2003). In this paper, both, the supervisor and
the subordinate, privately observe a subjective performance measure. In the
evaluation process, they must agree on a single evaluation result. This becomes
more and more difficult as the correlation of the two privately observed perfor-
mance measures declines. Disagreement is costly, as the subordinate is assumed
to punish the supervisor in case he has been treated unfairly, i.e. if his subjective
measure indicates a better rating than the measure observed by the supervisor.
2.3 This Work and the Literature
In the two preceding sections, we have viewed a large body of literature in a
quite general way. Furthermore, some particular strands of literature should
be mentioned, though an extensive overview would be too comprehensive to be
presented here. The present section shortly relates this thesis to contract theory in
general and to the literature on incentive provision in particular, both of which we
have already addressed in the above sections. In addition, we will take a glance at
the link between this work and the literature on bounded memory (Section 2.3.1).
Finally, we will refer to literature studying frequency issues from an economist’s
point of view in Section 2.3.2.
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Contract Theory
The models we will present in the following chapters are supposed to reproduce
interaction in situations of delegation. Therefore, all of them will be set up
in a principal-agent framework. Though, most of the time the agent’s effort is
assumed to be observable, the information regarding effort exertion is potentially
subject to a distortion due to the memory limitations of the principal. Whereas
in a classical principal-agent setup with moral hazard, the risk imposed on the
agent stems from an environmental shock, in our setup the risk depends on the
way evaluations are conducted. If the principal takes the cost to evaluate at the
end of every period, he has perfect information on the agent’s performance and
can adjust incentives efficiently. With fewer evaluations, the agent must be paid
a risk premium but evaluation cost is lowered.
As we restrict the analysis to linear compensation contracts (e.g. Holmstrom
and Milgrom; 1987), we do not provide an exhaustive study of optimal contracting
with different evaluation frequencies. Assuming that they are already in use, we
rather investigate in how far the design of linear contracts is affected by variations
in the frequency of evaluations.
Starting with a model without hidden action and risk aversion (Chapter 3), we
will gradually introduce more complexity in Chapter 4. Though, heterogeneity is
already dealt with in Chapter 5, problems with respect to hidden information and
screening in particular will not be considered until Chapter 6, where the principal
cannot distinguish between agents of different productivity.
Contract Theory and Incentive Provision
Of course, the literature on the use of performance evaluations is particularly
important for this research. By analyzing the advantages and drawbacks of diffe-
rent types of performance measures, we can better understand for which type of
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE 35
occupation evaluations based on subjective performance measures are suscepti-
ble. Also, the impact of measurement accuracy can be transferred to our setup
as figuratively, the frequency of evaluations enhances measurement accuracy by
balancing the effect of bounded memory.
In Section 2.2, we have referred to work that includes the existence of a bias
in the analysis of performance evaluations. Both works, Prendergast and Topel
(1996) and MacLeod (2003), derive the equilibrium outcome without integrating
reputation into the models. The setup we propose is relevant only for sufficiently
long time periods, which allow the creation of trust between the supervisor and
the employee being evaluated.3 The study by Gibbs et al. (2004) outlining the
importance of tenure for the effect of subjective performance evaluations is im-
portant evidence supporting our approach.
2.3.1 Evaluations and Memory
Since the path-breaking work of Herbert Simon on bounded rationality (e.g. Si-
mon; 1955), a large strand of economic literature makes the attempt to explain
the gap between behavior labeled as ”rational” by economists and the behav-
ior that is observed. An important contribution to this development has been
made by the integration of concepts from neighboring social sciences in economic
research (e.g. Kahneman; 2003). The study of incentive provision is a good ex-
ample. Whereas economists have focussed on efficiency under rational behavior,
other social sciences have analyzed behavior in response to incentives, but also
studied in how far environmental conditions as well as characteristics of an indi-
vidual conducting evaluations influence the evaluation outcome (e.g. D’Andrade;
1974, searches for systematic memory bias in the assessment of behavior).
In the present work, we analyze evaluations carried out by a supervisor who
is assumed to have imperfect memory. In economic modeling, there are different
3Conditions for self-enforcing contracts are considered in Chapter 4.
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ways to deal with memory imperfections. E.g. Piccione and Rubinstein (1997)
consider implications of imperfect recall in extensive decision problems with a
single player. In their setup, the forgetful player knows, that he might have
forgotten an action he has taken in the past, but he is aware of all possible
histories he might face. By contrast, Mullainathan (2002) provides a theoretical
model of bounded memory where the decision maker can be considered naive, i.e.
he acts as if he had not forgotten. Though using different approaches, both papers
emphasize situations where the loss of information due to imperfect memory
results in inefficiency.4
The situation we analyze in this thesis is quite close to work by Sarafidis
(2007). He characterizes the behavior of an individual that is rewarded on the
basis of an assessment of his past performance on a fixed date. The assessment is
provided by a supervisor who must rely on his imperfect memory to evaluate past
informative events. The supervisor in Sarafidis’ model is somewhat a receptor
who processes information according to a sophisticated model of memory, but
without any possibility to act. In contrast, the models presented in the following
chapters allow the principal to decide how often he wishes evaluations to take
place, so he has a means to cover up for his own bounded memory.5 In Sarafidis,
memory is governed by two effects: information which is received more recently
and information which is received more frequently is stored with a higher proba-
bility. This thesis only considers the former effect which consists in more recent
information being available from memory with a higher probability.6 In the long
run, this would be in line with the result presented in a paper on information
processing with bounded memory by Wilson (2004). It derives that for longer
4The opposite case is stressed in Frey (2005) where the focus is rather on information indi-
viduals would like to forget, but they are unable to do so.
5Also in Mitusch (2006), the player is aware of his forgetfulness and can strategically rehearse
information he judges to be particularly important for future decisions.
6Of course, this automatically puts limitations on the interpretation of the results as being
introduced by bounded memory. On the other hand, this simplistic approach has the advantage
that it easily allows us to view the results in the light of alternative interpretations.
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sequences of information a decision maker with bounded memory will put too
much weight on most recently received information.
2.3.2 Evaluation Frequency
Frequency issues are not prevalent in economic research due to the fact that it
is hard to give tangible answers to questions concerning frequency. In search of
an optimal frequency, the results generated by microeconomic models strongly
depend on the particular circumstances. An example for the study of optimal
frequency in public economics research is Akemann and Kanczuk (2003) who an-
alyze the effects of term lengths on welfare to gain insights on the optimal timing
of elections. Also, frequency is an important topic with respect to the analysis of
optimal monitoring policies (e.g. Ichino and Muehlheusser; 2004). Often, the fre-
quency of monitoring is modeled via the probability that an individual’s actions
are controlled.
Mitusch (2006) investigates under which circumstances a supervising mana-
ger will invest in additional costly monitoring if he has to justify a bad rating
of his subordinate in a performance evaluation with evidence. Whereas evidence
for poor performance discovered by monitoring is verifiable, the manger cannot
commit to monitoring as such, as it is unverifiable when no negative evidence
is found. Hence, a contract that engages the manager to monitoring is not en-
forceable and the degree of supervision will depend on the respective incentives
of the supervisor to do so. The optimal incentive contract depends on the moni-
toring cost, but also on the ability of the subordinate to engage in information
dissipation to convince the manager that costly monitoring is not necessary.
Whereas it might be difficult to commit to monitoring, we believe that evalua-
tions do not take place according to a probabilistic process or the discretion of a
supervisor. Rather, the frequency of evaluations is associated with deterministic
events as, especially for large firms, evaluations are part of internal guidelines.
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To our knowledge, Lazear (1990) is the only work formally addressing this issue.
Just as in the different models presented in this thesis, this is done by varying
the frequency of performance evaluations in a simple two-period setup. Though,
both papers put the question why the frequency of performance evaluations dif-
fers between professions or firms, and though, both explain a large part of the
differences by an informational effect of evaluations, the focus of Lazear’s rather
unknown early work is quite different to the present thesis. Whereas evaluation
frequency in our setup impacts the quality of the performance measure used in
the evaluation, in Lazear (1990) more frequent evaluations reveal information on
the employee’s productivity potential at the current firm, and hence, allow the
employee to eventually switch jobs at an earlier state if doing so is profitable.
As in the models presented in this thesis, in Lazear’s setup, the efficiency gains
of more frequent evaluations are traded off against the cost caused by this time-
consuming procedure.
Chapter 3
Evaluations and Bounded
Memory
3.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the role of the frequency of performance evaluations
in a simple incentive contract based on subjective performance evaluations. In
our model supervisors, even if aiming at truthful and correct evaluations, only
have a bounded capacity to handle the information necessary for the evaluation
process. This is plausible as the main task for superiors of middle-management
and engineering staff is rarely to supervise and evaluate employees, but this is
done additionally to their day-to-day work. When, furthermore, the observed
information on the output first needs to be analyzed to be useful for an evaluation,
we expect to find a bias in performance evaluations due to imperfect memory.
The supervisor in Sarafidis (2007) is in a sense a receptor who processes infor-
mation according to a sophisticated model of memory, but without any possibility
to act. In the following model, however, he can decide how often he wishes evalua-
tions to take place, so he has a means to work against his own bounded memory.
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We model only an effect which consists in more recent information being available
from memory with a higher probability. We will take the feasibility of implicit
contracts based on subjective performance as given and rather explore the specific
impact of bounded memory, i.e. a systematic bias in evaluations due to a recency
effect1. Like Akemann and Kanczuk (2003) and Lazear (1990), the following
model subdivides the entire time span in two periods to allow for comparison of
different choices concerning evaluation frequency.
In this two-period setting, a forgetful employer must decide how often he
should evaluate an employee who works for him. At a date which has been
fixed in advance, the employer attaches a subjective performance measure to the
information that he has gathered over the preceding evaluation period. We argue
that, depending on the length of this period, the quality of the information he has
stored varies due to bounded memory, so he probably has a rather precise idea on
how well his subordinate performed in the recent past, but events that are more
remote are also more likely to be forgotten. More frequent evaluations come at
a higher cost, but at the same time they also lead to more precise information
on which the principal can base the bonus payment for the agent. Given the
contract designed by the principal, the agent decides in each period whether to
exert high or low effort.
To gain additional insights, we also investigate the impact of a wealth-con-
strained employee. This implies that the agent receives a fixed compensation
component that is bounded from below—for instance due to a minimum wage—
and, therefore, can be higher than it would be optimal for the principal. The
design of the underlying principal-agent model is very close to Laffont and Mar-
timort (2002) who also introduce a wealth constraint in a discrete model. They
refer to the constraint as limited liability and interpret this restriction as a first
step towards risk aversion.
1This is the component of imperfect memory in Sarafidis (2007) which implies that more
recent information is stored with a higher probability.
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In the unrestricted model, we find that the principal never decides to evaluate
the agent in each period. His forgetfulness implies a higher variable payment
to the agent compared to perfect memory but he reincorporates this loss via a
negative fixed payment and, therefore, he can extract the entire surplus from the
employment relationship. For a wealth-constrained agent, the fixed compensation
component must be larger than the one optimally chosen by the principal. We
show that in this case, the formerly derived results will be affected in favor of
more frequent evaluations. Unlike before, part of the surplus possibly goes to the
agent.
In Section 3.2, we describe the setup of the basic model and how we will
solve it in the following sections. Section 3.3.1 derives the optimal choices of
the principal and the agent for the case of a principal who evaluates the agent’s
performance at the end of the last period. We repeat this analysis for the case of
two evaluations in Section 3.3.2. In Section 3.3.3 we investigate how the choice
of evaluation frequency changes if the agent is assumed to be wealth-constrained.
Section 3.4 sums up the results of the previous sections. Section 3.5 is a digression
and deals with the impact of a modified profit function, for which we provide a
distinct intuition. Section 3.6 concludes with the main insights on evaluation
frequency we can extract from the different model versions when an agent faces
a forgetful principal.
3.2 The Model Setup
In this section, we develop a model that shall capture a relatively long time span,
e.g. one year, in an ongoing employment relationship between a principal and an
agent. The principal, who faces imperfect memory, must decide on the frequency
of performance evaluations over the entire time span when he designs a contract.
In the model, this time span is subdivided into two periods to allow a comparison
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of different choices concerning evaluation frequency. Even though we consider
a two-period setting, we exclude discounting from the analysis to focus on the
effect of imperfect memory on evaluation practices.
The principal, who disposes of a production technology, has employed an
agent to be able to realize a surplus. But employment alone is not sufficient
for the surplus to materialize, additionally the employed agent needs to exert a
certain level of effort. Therefore, he has to be compensated for the disutility of
the effort necessary for the creation of the surplus. This is done by the use of
a linear contract, where a bonus depending on the agent’s performance is paid
in addition to a fixed base wage. Besides compensation, the principal possesses
another instrument he can use to design an optimal contract in our setup: by
investing in more frequent evaluations he can raise the quality of the available
performance information and, thus, reduce variable compensation. Or to put it
another way, he can decide to evaluate the agent less frequently but the additional
risk that emerges from worse information about the agent’s effort provision has
to be outweighed by higher incentive payments.
The principal can offer a contract that determines the payments the agent
receives for the output he generates on behalf of his employer. The contract is
valid for the entire time span and in each period the agent decides how hard
he works (high or low effort). It is common knowledge between the agent and
the principal that if the agent exerts high effort (eH), he produces high output
(piH) with certainty, that is eH ⇔ piH . Analogously we have eL ⇔ piL for low
effort (eL) and low output (piL). We define piH , eH > 0 and for simplicity, we set
low effort and low output to zero, eL = piL = 0. To express these properties in
the model, we choose the linear function pii = f · ei, with i = L,H, to describe
the relationship between the agent’s effort ei and the output pii. The parameter f
stands for the productivity of the agent, which is assumed to be larger than one.
As the output the agent generates with low effort is zero, the principal always
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wants the agent to work hard. An incentive compatible contract therefore implies
the choice of eH on part of the agent in both periods.
Both contracting parties are risk-neutral and compensation is paid via a fixed
component α as well as a variable component depending on a bonus factor β.
Thus, we analyze linear contracts only. Compensation based on β is tied to
the agent’s performance, which is the output he generates during the two peri-
ods.2 We assume that the principal is able to observe the unverifiable output in
each period, but he cannot immediately translate it into a quantifiable measure
that enters the bonus function. First, the employee’s achievements need to be
reviewed, quantified, and made explicit through a performance evaluation. So
a costly thinking and classifying process must be undertaken to translate the
observed performance into explicit quantitative terms that reflect the impact of
performance on the principal’s profit. This process is what we call the evalua-
tion of the agent’s performance. An important assumption is that the employer
cannot remember information perfectly over time as long as the information he
has observed has not been made explicit through an evaluation. So a principal
who decides to save the cost of evaluating his agent immediately, might forget
the performance he observed. In the model, this is represented by the principal
remembering the observed output only with some probability ρ in the follow-
ing period, if not both, production of output and an evaluation, have occurred
previously.
When there are gains from contracting, the principal must decide how often
to evaluate the agent: each period (twice) or at the end of the last period (once).
Each evaluation comes at a fixed cost cE. So on the one hand, more frequent
evaluations are more expensive, but on the other hand, they lead to more precise
information on which the principal can base the bonus payment for the agent.
2Note that the terms performance, effort, and output can be used as synonyms as long as
the production process is deterministic.
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If one of the parties refuses to accept the contract, there will be no employment
relationship.
The chronology of events is the following. First, the principal designs a con-
tract which contains the number of times the agent is evaluated, the amount of
a fixed wage component and the bonus depending on the evaluated performance.
The agent accepts the contract if his expected utility from the incentive contract
is at least as high as his outside option, otherwise he rejects the offer. Once
accepted, the contract lasts for two periods, and in each period the agent de-
cides whether to work hard. The principal observes and receives the output the
agent produces and evaluates him truthfully on the basis of what he observed.
But due to imperfect memory, the principal remembers the observed output only
with some probability if there has been no evaluation in the same period. To
summarize, we give a brief overview of the events:
• Period τ = 0: if there is a positive surplus, the principal designs a work
contract which contains the number of times the agent is evaluated, a fixed
wage component α, and a factor β that, when multiplied with the agent’s
evaluated performance, determines variable compensation; the agent ac-
cepts or rejects the contract
• Period τ = 1: the agent exerts effort e1 ∈ {eL, eH}, eL = 0, eH > 0 to
produce the first-period output pi1; the fixed wage α is paid out
• Period τ = 2: the agent exerts effort e2 ∈ {eL, eH}, eL = 0, eH > 0 to
produce the output pi2; the bonus payment is calculated according to Al-
ternative 1 or 2 and paid out to the agent
• Alternative 1: One Evaluation
– the fixed wage is denoted by αo
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– when it comes to the evaluation of the agent’s work at the end of the
second period the principal remembers the observed output in period
one with probability ρ ∈ ]0, 1[
– a fixed evaluation cost cE arises at the end of the second period
– the agent is paid his bonus βo · (ρpi1 + pi2) at the end of the second
period
• Alternative 2: Two Evaluations
– the fixed wage is denoted by αt
– the principal evaluates at the end of each period and therefore correctly
remembers the agent’s output he observed over the two periods
– his total evaluation cost increases to 2 · cE
– the agent receives a bonus βt · (pi1+pi2) for his output over two periods
With this information at hand, we can write down the expected profit function
of the principal in the case of one evaluation (superscript: o) and two evaluations
(superscript: t):
E[Πo(pi1, pi2)] = pi1 + pi2 − αo − βo(ρpi1 + pi2)− cE,
E[Πt(pi1, pi2)] = pi1 + pi2 − αt − βt(pi1 + pi2)− 2cE.
period τ = 0 period τ = 1
e1
α
cE
period τ = 2
e2
cE
cE
agent effort
compensation
principal »»
»»»
»
XXXXXX
contract (α, β) with
one evaluation
β(ρpi1 + pi2)
contract (α, β) with
two evaluations
β(pi1 + pi2)
Figure 3.1: The Chronological Order of the Game
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The expected utility of the agent takes into account compensation as well as the
disutility from the provision of effort:
E[U o(e1, e2)] = α
o + βo(ρpi1 + pi2)− (e1 + e2),
E[U t(e1, e2)] = α
t + βt(pi1 + pi2)− (e1 + e2).
The principal and the agent receive zero utility if they choose the outside option,
i.e. U¯ = 0.
3.3 Analysis of the Model
We solve two versions of the model—a version with one evaluation and a version
with two evaluations—for subgame perfect Nash Equilibria via backward induc-
tion. In the course of the backward induction of each model version, we derive
under which circumstances the agent chooses to work hard for given compensa-
tion parameters α and β. Moreover, we determine the parameter combinations
in which he will be willing to work at all. If the principal’s expected profit is po-
sitive, he will choose those parameters (α and β) which yield the highest return.
Otherwise he will refrain from offering a contract. After deriving the parameters
for the model with one and with two evaluations, we will consider the principal’s
decision on the evaluation frequency that he fixes in the contract in period τ = 0.
We repeat the analysis for a wealth-constrained agent—this implies that α must
be larger than some lower bound—and examine how such an assumption changes
the preceding results.
3.3.1 One Evaluation
Given the fact that the principal evaluates performance only at the end of the se-
cond period and, therefore, has imperfect recall (represented by the parameter ρ),
we now investigate for which payment schemes the agent is willing to exert high
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effort. We then derive the corresponding profit for the principal and deduce his
optimal choice of the contract parameters for one evaluation. Independent of the
actual effort levels he chooses, the agent’s expected utility over the two periods
can be expressed by:
E[U o(e1, e2)] = α
o + βo(ρpi1 + pi2)− (e1 + e2) . (3.1)
And the principal’s expected profit is:
E[Πo(e1, e2)] = pi1 + pi2 − αo − βo(ρpi1 + pi2)− cE . (3.2)
Now, we calculate the critical parameter values for which high effort is chosen.
The incentive constraints for the corresponding first-period effort level (IC1)
and for the second-period effort level (IC2) must be fulfilled. Furthermore, the
participation constraint (PC) must hold. So the agent will choose high effort in
both periods, i.e. e1 = e2 = eH , if the following conditions are satisfied:
(IC1) : E[U o(eH , e2)] ≥ E[U o(eL, e2)]⇔ βo ≥ 1fρ , (3.3)
(IC2) : E[U o(e1, eH)] ≥ E[U o(e1, eL)]⇔ βo ≥ 1f , (3.4)
(PC) : E[U o(eH)] ≥ E[U(0)] = 0⇔ αo ≥ [2− βof(1 + ρ)]eH . (3.5)
As ρ ∈ ]0, 1[ holds by definition, we can infer that 1
fρ
> 1
f
holds as well. Hence,
only (IC1) in equation (3.3) is binding. A profit maximizing principal will imple-
ment the desired effort level at the lowest cost possible. If we set βo = 1
fρ
, we can
plug this into equation (3.5) to calculate the lowest αo in an incentive compatible
contract that implements high effort:
αo =
[
2− 1
fρ
f(1 + ρ)
]
eH = −1− ρ
ρ
eH . (3.6)
CHAPTER 3. EVALUATIONS AND BOUNDED MEMORY 48
Since the principal is expected to forget part of the agent’s first-period perfor-
mance, it is more costly to require high effort in the first period than motivating
the agent in the second period. The optimal fixed component αo in the contract
is negative, so the agent has to pay the principal to be allowed to work for him.
We will analyze restrictions to this possibility using a more general framework in
Section 3.3.3.
Given these contract parameters, we can calculate the principal’s profit when
he proposes an incentive compatible contract:
E[Πo(eH)] = 2(f − 1)eH − cE . (3.7)
We have just derived the profit of the principal and an optimal pair of con-
tract parameters. Additionally, offering a contract has to be at least as good as
refraining from it, i.e. choosing the outside option:
E[Πo(eH)] ≥ 0⇔ f ≥ 1 + cE
2eH
:= f o . (3.8)
Condition (3.8) expresses the extend to which the agent’s productivity f must be
larger than one for the employment relationship to be profitable.
3.3.2 Two Evaluations
In the preceding analysis, the principal was not able to remember the agent’s
first period performance with certainty when he evaluated him at the end of the
second period. In this section he makes an evaluation at the end of each period,
so there will be no loss of information and, therefore, the parameter ρ does no
longer appear. As each evaluation comes at fixed cost cE, the total evaluation
cost increases to 2cE. We will now calculate the conditions under which the agent
chooses high effort. Furthermore, we will again derive the principal’s optimal
behavior and the corresponding profit. In a setting with two evaluations, the
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agent’s utility over the two periods is:
E[U t(e1, e2)] = α
t + βtf(e1 + e2)− (e1 + e2) = αt + (βtf − 1)(e1 + e2) , (3.9)
where αt is the fixed wage component and βt the bonus parameter for a contract
with two evaluations. The principal’s profit function now also takes into account
the doubled evaluation cost:
E[Πt(e1, e2)] = (1− βt)f(e1 + e2)− αt − 2cE . (3.10)
To derive the incentive compatible contract parameters in the case of two evalua-
tions, we can use the results from Section 3.3.1 and set ρ = 1 as this corresponds
to perfect memory. Using (3.3), (3.4), and with ρ = 1 we get βt = 1
f
. Plugging
this into equation (3.5) and again accounting for ρ = 1, we find the lowest αt for
this incentive compatible contract:
αt =
[
2− 2f
f
]
eH = 0 . (3.11)
These contract parameters allow us to calculate the principal’s profit when he
proposes a contract that implements high effort:
E[Πt(eH)] = 2(f − 1)eH − 2cE. (3.12)
It now remains to be determined under which parameter values the principal will
prefer an incentive compatible contract to refraining from a contractual relation-
ship. The condition for a contract to be profitable is:
E[Πt(eH)] ≥ 0⇔ f ≥ 1 + cE
eH
:= f t . (3.13)
If (3.13) does not hold, the principal will choose his outside option or evaluate
only once.
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3.3.3 Evaluating a Wealth-Constrained Agent
In the preceding analysis, we have implicitly assumed that the agent disposes
over infinite wealth. No matter how high the fee the principal fixes in a contract
with one evaluation, the agent will be able to pay this sum. In this subsection,
we extend the analysis by allowing for a wealth-constrained agent. We do this
by introducing a wealth bound α¯, which is the maximal amount the agent is able
to pay in the first period. As long as in absolute terms α¯ is larger than or equal
to the optimal fee αo from Section 3.3.1 the analysis remains unaffected. But a
restriction in the range 0 ≥ α¯ > αo has an impact on the contracts the principal
can propose with one evaluation.3 The analysis with two evaluations remains
unchanged as, in this case, the optimal alpha is zero and, therefore, compatible
with any wealth restriction.
To observe what happens in the case of a wealth restriction, we simply have to
repeat the analysis for one evaluation, replacing the optimal αo by α¯. This implies
that the principal can only charge the agent an amount α¯, which is lower than
the optimal one but he cannot lower incentives as he already chooses the lowest
incentive compatible β. So a wealth constraint lowers the principal’s profits. The
participation constraint is tightened, whereas the incentive constraint remains
unchanged. The expected profit for high effort in both periods with one evaluation
becomes:
E[Πo(eH |α¯)] = (2f − 1+ρρ )eH − α¯− cE . (3.14)
To facilitate the interpretation, we can define the constant a = α¯ − αo which
determines to what extent the magnitude of the wealth constraint differs from
the optimal αo in a contract with one evaluation. With this definition the wealth
bound can be reformulated as α¯ = a− 1−ρ
ρ
eH . Using this expression, the princi-
3One could also introduce a minimum wage as constraint for α. So the restriction α¯ ≤ 0 is
not crucial for the results, but has been chosen for reasons of consistency with the interpretation
of the bound as a wealth-constraint.
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pal’s profit simplifies to
E[Πo(eH , a|α¯)] = 2(f − 1)eH − a− cE . (3.15)
So one can see that the profit with one evaluation and a wealth constraint below
zero is identical to equation (3.7) minus a, i.e. the deviation of the bound from
the optimal fixed wage.
Returning to our previous notation, it is profitable to motivate the agent to
exert high effort if:
E[Πo(eH |α¯)] ≥ 0⇔ f ≥ 12(1+ρρ + α¯+cEeH ) := f o(α¯) . (3.16)
This condition corresponds to the condition in (3.8), but due to the introduction of
the wealth constraint α¯ the memory parameter ρ now also influences profitability.
The principal can no longer entirely charge the agent for the cost of bounded
memory, so his expected profit from a one-evaluation contract diminishes the
closer ρ gets to zero. Due to α¯ ≤ 0 the profitability condition for two evaluations
in (3.13) remains valid.
3.4 Results
We complete the analysis by deriving the behavior of the agent and the principal
throughout the entire game. This is done by a comparison of the principal’s
profits which are summarized in Table 3.1. We will first deal with the case
Case: α R 0 α ≥ α¯
E[Πo(eH)] 2(f − 1)eH − cE (2f − 1+ρρ )eH − α¯− cE
E[Πt(eH)] 2(f − 1)eH − 2cE 2(f − 1)eH − 2cE
Table 3.1: All Profits
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One Evaluation Two Evaluations
E[Πo/t(eH)] ≥ 0 f ≥ 1 + cE2eH = fo f ≥ 1 + cEeH = f t
E[Πo/t(eH)] 2(f − 1)eH − cE 2(f − 1)eH − 2cE
αo/t − 1−ρρ eH 0
βo/t 1fρ
1
f
Table 3.2: Results for One and Two Evaluations
of unrestricted wealth. Without a binding wealth constraint, the profit with a
single evaluation is always higher than with two evaluations, as the principal
hands on the cost of his forgetfulness to the agent by ”paying” a negative fixed
compensation. In other words, switching from one to two evaluations leaves
the principal’s revenue unchanged—it is the agent who bears the entire cost of
the principal’s forgetfulness—and it only raises his fixed cost. Subsequently, we
review this result when the agent’s wealth is assumed to lie somewhere between
the optimal αo and zero. When the agent has a binding wealth constraint, two
evaluations can be chosen for certain parameters of the model. The principal
is no longer able to hand on the entire cost of his forgetfulness and hence, the
two-evaluation contract becomes more advantageous.
No Wealth Constraint
Table 3.2 resumes critical values as well as optimal contract parameters and
the corresponding profits in the unrestricted model. The critical values of the
productivity parameter f , determining the principal’s choice between the two
contracts and the outside option, are always independent of ρ. For one evaluation,
the more the principal forgets (smaller ρ), the more he will charge the agent via
αo = −1−ρ
ρ
eH , where
∂αo
∂ρ
= ρ−(ρ−1)
ρ2
eH =
1
ρ2
eH > 0. He can do so because he is
a monopsonistic employer and the agent’s outside option equals zero. The agent
agrees as the fee he pays is outweighed by the variable compensation he receives.
To put it another way, due to the principal’s forgetfulness, the agent can extract a
CHAPTER 3. EVALUATIONS AND BOUNDED MEMORY 53
rent via the variable compensation. But thanks to his market power, the principal
can recover the rent by charging a fee corresponding to the amount of the rent.
We determine the principal’s choice concerning the evaluation frequency by
a comparison of his possible gains with one and with two evaluations. Equa-
tion (3.17) illustrates a straight-forward result. As the principal can shift the
cost of his forgetfulness to the agent, his profit with a single evaluation is always
higher than with two evaluations since the latter imply a higher fixed cost:
E[Πo(eH)] > E[Π
t(eH)]⇔
2(f − 1)eH − cE > 2(f − 1)eH − 2cE ⇔ cE > 0 .
(3.17)
This equation (3.17) leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Evaluating once is a dominant strategy for the principal if he
faces a risk-neutral agent who has no wealth constraint.
Proof. As the evaluation cost is assumed to be larger than zero, equation (3.17)
holds. Consequently, the profit from a one-evaluation contract exceeds the one
of a two-evaluation contract.
Wealth-Constrained Agent
Comparing profits with one and with two evaluations leads to the following in-
equality:
E[Πo(eH |α¯)] R E[Πt(eH)]⇔ −1−ρρ eH R α¯− cE . (3.18)
While evaluating twice is unattractive as long as α is unbounded, this changes
when we assume that the agent is wealth-constrained. Due to the fact that he is
now unable to pay the optimal αo < α¯ for entering the contractual relationship,
the extent of the principal’s memory imperfection becomes determinant for his
choice between the contracts. According to the inequality in (3.18), we can divide
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Case: α R 0 α ≥ α¯
E[Πo(eH)] R E[Πt(eH)] cE > 0 αo = − 1−ρρ eH R α¯− cE
E[Πo(eH)] ≥ 0 f ≥ 1 + cE2eH f ≥
1+ρ
2ρ +
α¯+cE
2eH
E[Πt(eH)] ≥ 0 f ≥ 1 + cEeH f ≥ 1 + cEeH
Result: one evaluation if − 1−ρρ eH > α¯− cE : one evaluations
or outside option or outside option
if − 1−ρρ eH < α¯− cE : two evaluations
or outside option
Table 3.3: Tradeoffs between the Principal’s Options
our results into two cases. In a first parameter range, the probability that the
principal will forget the observed performance is high, relative to the difference
of the fixed cost of employing the agent, i.e. the evaluation cost minus the fixed
compensation component. Under these circumstances, the principal will either
offer a contract with two evaluations inducing high effort in every period or he
will not employ the agent. In a second parameter range, where the effect of
the principal’s imperfect memory is too weak for more than one evaluation to
be profitable, the principal either chooses a contract with high effort and one
evaluation or he does not offer any contract. Table 3.3 lists the tradeoffs between
all relevant options of the principal. Table 3.4 reviews the optimal choices, critical
values and outcomes when the agent is wealth-constrained.
Proposition 2 If the agent has limited wealth, the optimal evaluation frequency
depends on the following conditions:
(i) If −1−ρ
ρ
eH > α¯− cE, the agent will be evaluated once.
(ii) If −1−ρ
ρ
eH < α¯− cE, the agent will be evaluated twice.
Otherwise, the principal is indifferent between one and two evaluations.
The proof directly follows from the inequality in (3.18).
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One Evaluation Two Evaluations
1−ρ
ρ eH < cE − α¯ 1−ρρ eH > cE − α¯
E[Πo/t(eH |α¯)] ≥ 0 f ≥ 1+ρ2ρ + α¯+cE2eH f ≥ 1 + cEeH
E[Πo/t(eH |α¯)] (2f − 1+ρρ )eH − α¯− cE 2(f − 1)eH − 2cE
αo/t α¯ 0
βo/t 1fρ
1
f
E[Πo/t(eH |α¯)] < 0 f < 1+ρ2ρ + α¯+cE2eH f < 1 + cEeH
Table 3.4: Results with a Wealth-Constrained Agent
3.5 A Setup with Depreciation of Output
In the previous analysis, we have described how a forgetful principal will design
a linear contract when he might forget part of the agent’s performance until the
time of the evaluation, but takes the produced output entirely into account in
his profit function. To point out the impact of the assumption that the principal
benefits entirely from the output—no matter if he forgets it or not—we will now
analyze how the optimal contract changes when the first period output enters
the profit function with probability θ only, instead of being taken into account
entirely. When θ equals ρ, the principal is not forgetful, but only evaluates the
fraction of the output that remains after the depreciation. The case θ < ρ could be
interpreted as a combination of depreciation and forgetfulness, while with θ > ρ
we have a benevolent principal, who ignores part of the depreciation, determined
by the difference of the two parameters. The agent’s incentive and participation
constraints in (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) remain unaffected by this modification, but
the expected profit for one evaluation now is denoted by:
E[Π˜o(e1, e2)] = θpi1 + pi2 − αo − βo(ρpi1 + pi2)− cE . (3.19)
Plugging in the incentive compatible values for αo and βo yields:
E[Π˜o(eH)] = [θ − 1fρρ+ 1− 1fρ ]feH − ρ−1ρ eH − cE . (3.20)
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Compared to equation (3.7), profit with one evaluation in this setup is lowered by
(1 − θ)feH . As profit depends on the depreciation parameter θ, this parameter
now influences profitability and, therefore, the choice of evaluation frequency.
The profitability condition is:
E[Π˜o(eH)] ≥ 0⇔
f(1 + θ)eH − 2eH − cE ≥ 0⇔ f ≥ 2eH+cE(1+θ)eH := f o(θ) .
(3.21)
To ensure profitability the productivity parameter f must be larger than the
critical f o we derived in (3.8). Furthermore, comparing profits with one and with
two evaluations leads us to:
E[Π˜o(eH)] R E[Πt(eH)]⇔ f Q cE
(1− θ)eH . (3.22)
This result is different from the comparison in (3.17) as now there is a parameter
range where the principal will prefer to evaluate an agent who is not wealth-
constrained twice. To derive the parameter range where one evaluation is chosen,
we combine the profitability condition and the condition for E[Π˜o(eH , eH)] ≥
E[Πt(eH , eH)]. Then f ≥ 2eH+cE(1+ρ)eH and f <
cE
(1−ρ)eH must hold at the same time.
Such a productivity f exists if:
cE
(1− θ)eH >
2eH + cE
(1 + θ)eH
⇔ 1− θ
θ
eH < cE . (3.23)
The condition in (3.23) allows us to split our results into two categories, one where
only two evaluations or the outside option will be chosen and another category
where one or two evaluations will be chosen for profitable parameter ranges. The
results are summarized in Table 3.5. As θ lowers the expected surplus for one
evaluation, of course social welfare—in this setup this equals profit—is inferior to
the one-evaluation welfare in a model without depreciation. Note that contrary
to the results in Table 3.4, the critical condition does not split the results into a
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1−θ
θ eH > cE
1−θ
θ eH < cE
Π˜o(eH) ≥ 0 - cE(1−θ)eH > f ≥ 2eH+cE(1+θ)eH
Π˜o(eH) - f(1 + θ)eH − 2eH − cE
Πt(eH) ≥ 0 f ≥ 1 + cEeH f > cE(1−θ)eH
Πt(eH) 2(f − 1)eH − 2cE 2(f − 1)eH − 2cE
Π˜o(eH)/Πt(eH) < 0 f < 1 + cEeH f <
2eH+cE
(1+θ)eH
Table 3.5: Results with Depreciation of Output
range with one evaluation and another with two evaluations, but for 1−θ
θ
eH < cE
both are possible, depending on the productivity f .
After doing the calculus, we would like to give some intuition for the modi-
fication of the profit function. Therefore we will shortly describe two examples
that reflect the situation designed in the model. Both are related to research, one
is about Ph.D. students, and another one about employees in R&D departments.
The classical way to obtain a Ph.D. used to be to write a thesis, consisting
in a monograph, resuming the entire research work of several years, and a dispu-
tation of the monograph’s content. Today, most Ph.D. students’ work consists
of writing papers which shall be published as soon as possible. While the clas-
sical Ph.D. student’s research risks to be obsolete by the date of his disputation
(sometimes years after the creation of the work), the up-to-date Ph.D. student,
who is evaluated with each paper he finishes, has a clear advantage as his output
is not subject to devaluation until the date of a possible publication. Of course,
one could argue that the supervisor of a Ph.D. thesis that comes as a monograph
should take into account that at the time of the research being actually done, this
was state of the art. But one would at least expect that a supervisor will grade
this student worse than a peer who’s research output has not been devaluated,
e.g. by similar but more recent publications on the same topic. Superiority of the
newer practice could be suggested by its rapid propagation.
We can draw a similar scenario for an R&D department. Suppose researchers
in the department are paid a bonus for patents providing the firm with a com-
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petitive advantage. If the evaluation of an initially successful patent occurs at
a point in time where the competitive advantage has been destroyed by another
more recent patent, this is likely to induce the supervisor to pay no bonus, as the
patent does not provide an advantage for the firm at the time of the evaluation.
Both examples fit a model where output can lose its value over time and only
the observed output at the time of the assessment enters the evaluation. With
this in mind, it becomes intuitively clearer why in the basic model presented in
Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 two evaluations must be a dominated choice. The principal
has the entire market power, so he will naturally refrain from any action that
diminishes welfare, i.e. his profit.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyzed which role frequency plays for performance evalua-
tions if supervisors cannot retain information perfectly over time and agents are
risk-neutral or wealth-constrained. The main result of the unrestricted model is
as following. The fact that the quality of performance information depends on
evaluation frequency does not automatically create a trade-off between evaluation
and incentive cost. In a contract that contains variable and fixed compensation,
the principal does not need more frequent evaluations of the agent to counter-
balance his forgetfulness. The additional incentive cost caused by the loss of
information due to imperfect memory will simply be shifted to the agent via a
negative fixed compensation. Therefore, it is not surprising that the choice be-
tween providing high incentives and refraining from a contractual relationship
remains unaffected as the level of the principal’s forgetfulness varies.
But when we consider wealth-constrained agents, this outcome is weakened
and now the principal’s choice hinges on the degree of forgetfulness. More fre-
quent evaluations become more profitable the higher the degree of forgetfulness,
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the lower the fixed cost of the evaluation, and the more the agent is wealth-
constrained.
Due to the principal’s monopsonistic position, his profit in the unconstrained
model is identical to the entire surplus and the chosen contract leaves the agent
with zero utility. With a binding wealth-constraint, the agent’s utility is strictly
positive for one evaluation. While the distribution of the surplus changes in this
case, its size remains unaffected by the new split. But when first period incentives
for one evaluation become too expensive the principal switches to two evaluations
and lowers the surplus at stake due to an increased evaluation cost. Again, the
agent’s utility equals zero.
In our digression in Section 3.5, the evaluation frequency also affects the value
of the first period output in the principal’s profit function. This gives us more
intuition why one evaluation is a dominant strategy in the basic model. We
find examples from the domain of research for which the modified model seems
particularly well-suited.
The way we set up the model also leaves space for further interpretations
where supervisors face other types of bias. One example is systematical cau-
tiousness. But the principal could also use what is referred to as a distorted
performance measure (e.g. Moen and Rose´n; 2005) and this distortion can be
lowered at some cost. In addition, allowing for decreasing instead of fixed evalua-
tion cost will strengthen the result under the wealth constraint. We expect more
frequent evaluations to gain importance with respect to the basic model when
we consider risk-averse agents. This is in line with the intuition given in Laffont
and Martimort (2002), who assign similar features to situations with a wealth
constraint as to a setup with risk aversion.
It seems plausible to assume that middle-managers and employees in com-
parable positions are wealth-constrained, though we cannot say anything about
the extent of such a restriction. At least, we would expect them to be risk-
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averse. This suggests that for the design of optimal subjective review processes
of middle-managers and alike, not only the measures used are important. Also,
the frequency with which evaluations take place does play a role. While there is
a strong focus on the nature of performance measures, up to now, there has been
little research on the parameters determining the framework of the evaluation
process. This chapter is a first step to investigate the interdependencies at work
in this context. In the following chapter, we will deepen the analysis by explicitly
introducing risk aversion of the agent in the model setup.
Chapter 4
Risk-Averse Agents
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate which role the frequency of performance evalua-
tions plays for incentive contracts when risk aversion is introduced. We present a
straightforward model analyzing the impact of evaluation frequency in an employ-
ment relationship between a forgetful principal and a risk-averse agent. Within
our two-period setting, we will derive how often a risk-neutral and forgetful em-
ployer should evaluate a risk-averse employee. Again, the employer reconsiders
the agent’s performance over the preceding period at periodical dates by attach-
ing a subjective performance measure to the afore-gathered information. Due to
bounded memory, the quality of the stored information varies depending on the
length of the period the evaluation refers to. The principal has a rather precise
idea on how well the agent performed in recent time, but events that are more
remote are more likely to be forgotten. Each evaluation induces a fixed cost,
such that a higher evaluation frequency is more costly on the one hand, but it
leads to more precise information for the computation of a bonus payment on the
other hand. Therefore, with each evaluation, the risk imposed on the agent is
being reduced. Given the compensation parameters and the evaluation frequency
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chosen in the employment contract the agent decides in each period whether he
will provide effort.
We find that risk aversion on behalf of the agent is at the origin of the princi-
pal’s decision problem concerning the optimal evaluation frequency. If the agent
was risk-neutral, evaluating only in the very last contractual period would be
a dominant strategy. However, with a risk-averse agent, the optimal evalua-
tion frequency will be determined by trading off the efficiency loss induced by
the principal’s bounded memory against the cost of an additional evaluation.1
Furthermore, we can show in an extension that this trade-off—as well as its con-
ditionality on the agent’s attitude towards risk—is robust to the introduction of
a second source of risk, i.e. a stochastic shock on output.
In Section 4.2, we present the setup of the model and its solution in a principal-
agent structure. Section 4.3 discusses assumptions and possible extensions to the
basic model in a general way. Section 4.4 sums up the results and concludes with
the main insights on evaluation frequency we can extract from the model with a
risk-averse agent.
4.2 The Basic Model with Risk Aversion
4.2.1 Setup
The basic model investigates the role of evaluation frequency in performance-
based contracts by focussing on a particular time span, e.g. one year, in an ongoing
employment relationship. To allow for inferences concerning evaluation frequency,
this time span is subdivided into two periods. A risk-neutral principal is the
owner of a production technology. To be able to extract a surplus from it, he
must employ an agent who exerts a sufficiently high level of effort. For the
1This is in line with previous results in Chapter 3 where a wealth-constraint can be inter-
preted as a deviation from risk-neutrality (see Laffont and Martimort (2002, p. 155)).
CHAPTER 4. RISK-AVERSE AGENTS 63
two periods he designs an employment contract. This contract contains a linear
compensation formula as well as a commitment to a frequency with which the
agent will be evaluated during the contractual period (once or twice in our two-
period model). Concentrating on linear compensation should not be seen as a
restriction, as we analyze a discrete two-period model and, therefore, any type
of payment structure can be represented by a linear formula. Another restriction
deserves more attention here. We do not allow the principal to fully differentiate
between the first and the second period in the contract, i.e. equal performance
must be equally compensated for in both periods. In terms of a linear contract,
this implies that for the two periods only one bonus factor determining the agent’s
share of the generated revenue can be fixed in the contractual agreement.2 Once
the principal has made a contract offer, the risk-averse agent will decide whether
to work for him or not. In addition, he must decide on the levels of effort he is
ready to exert in each of the periods.
The agent can choose between two possible levels of effort, eL and eH , which
enter the production process and result in the principal’s revenue pii = f · ei
(with i = H,L). As for now, we do not consider a random shock, that could ad-
ditionally influence the amount of the revenue.3 The parameter f > 1 represents
the productivity of the agent. We define eH , piH > 0 and normalize low effort
and low output to zero, i.e. eL = piL = 0. The production function is common
knowledge between the two contracting parties.
It is important to point out again that we analyze a situation with subjec-
tive performance evaluation. The employee’s effort and the revenue—which is the
value of the agent’s output—are unverifiable for third parties but can be costlessly
observed by the principal in each period. The agent dislikes effort, therefore the
employer offers an incentive payment to compensate for the corresponding disu-
2As it will become clear that the results crucially depend on this assumption, we will exten-
sively discuss it in Section 4.3.1.
3Results for a model version with a stochastic shock influencing the creation of the revenue
are given in the appendix and will be discussed in Section 4.3.2.
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tility ei. The amount of this bonus is calculated as the product of a factor β,
specified in the contract, and the information on the past performance the princi-
pal has at the last evaluation date. In addition to the bonus, the principal might
want to include a fixed payment α into the contract.
Another important feature of the model is that the principal has bounded
memory in the sense that he can forget observed performance information until
the next period. In the model, ρ is the probability of the principal to remember
the information and logically the probability of forgetting is (1−ρ). Forgetting is
possible because we consider a situation with subjective performance information
which cannot be reconstructed later on if it has not been properly stored. It is
only during the evaluation process that the employee’s achievements are reviewed,
quantified, made explicit and can therefore be preserved for later use. On the one
hand, evaluating the agent prevents the principal from forgetting the observed
level of performance but, on the other hand, this evaluation procedure comes at a
cost cE, which can be attributed to the time the principal spends on the analysis
and treatment of the information necessary for the evaluation. As mentioned
before, evaluations are truthful and will be carried out with certainty if this is
specified in the contract.
Now, the agent’s utility increases in fixed and variable pay and it decreases
in effort. Due to the principal’s bounded memory, a bonus will only be paid
with probability ρ if previously there has been no evaluation. This is how the
principal’s forgetfulness introduces risk to the wage payment. As the agent is
risk-averse, we assume a utility function that is overall concave. To keep the
framework simple, effort cost and the fixed wage enter the agent’s utility function
linearly with their monetary value. Concavity comes through the first-period
bonus payment that is valued only after the application of a strictly concave
function u(·) to a bonus payment x. The latter function additionally has the
properties u(0) = 0, and u(x) < x ∀ x, where x is the total bonus payment of
a period. It is not decisive for the results that bonus payments from different
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periods do not enter the utility function in the same way. This is the case as we
are not interested in an inter-temporal comparison but in comparing two settings
with different evaluation frequencies.
The chronology of events is analogous to the one in Chapter 3. When a positive
surplus can be generated through the employment relationship, the principal
designs a two-period work contract in period τ = 0. The contract contains the
number of times the agent will be evaluated, a fixed wage component α, and a
bonus factor β. This bonus factor determines variable compensation when it is
multiplied with the level of performance of the agent, which has been assessed in
the evaluation. If one party rejects the contract, both players receive the utility
of their outside option. After the acceptance of the contract, the employee exerts
effort e1 ∈ {eL, eH} in period τ = 1 to generate the first-period revenue pi1 ∈
{piL, piH}. Also, the fixed wage α is payed in advance.4 Analogously, in period τ =
2 the agent exerts effort e2 ∈ {eL, eH} to create pi2 ∈ {piL, piH}. Now, the expected
bonus payment is calculated and payed to the agent. The computation of the
bonus depends on the evaluation frequency. When the principal evaluates only
in the second period, he remembers the first-period revenue pi1 = f · e1 with
probability ρ ∈ ]0, 1[. A fixed evaluation cost of cE arises, and the agent receives
an expected bonus of β ·(ρpi1+pi2) = βf(ρe1+e2) at the end of the second period.
With two evaluations, the principal reviews the employee’s performance at the
end of each period and, therefore, correctly remembers what he has observed
over the entire time span. His total evaluation cost increases to 2cE and the
agent receives a bonus β(pi1 + pi2) = βf(e1 + e2) which accurately reflects his
performance during the two periods. Note that the bonus corresponding to the
low effort level equals zero.
We solve two versions of the discrete model, a version with one evaluation,
where the agent risks not to be payed the first-period bonus, and a second ver-
4One should keep in mind that in a framework without discounting, the timing of the
payments is not very important. For example, paying out the fixed compensation during the
first period is equivalent to paying α′ = α2 in every period.
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sion with two evaluations. For each model version, backward induction yields
the subgame-perfect equilibrium. First, we calculate for which compensation
parameters α and β the agent is ready to join the contract and to work hard.
With this information at hand, the principal maximizes his profit by choosing the
lowest payment inducing high effort in both periods. Comparing the outcomes
with one and with two evaluations allows us to make inferences on the optimal
evaluation frequency. Although we present a two-period model, we do not con-
sider discounting in order to focus entirely on the impact of imperfect memory
on optimal evaluation frequency.
4.2.2 One Evaluation
When designing the contract, the principal has two strategies at hand. He can
choose to evaluate once despite the fact that this imposes a risk on the agent or he
prefers to evaluate twice. To model his choice, we first specify the parties’ payoffs
and then compare them under the different regimes. We start with the case
of one evaluation where the principal might understate the agent’s first period
performance when he evaluates him at the end of the second period. Expressed
in monetary terms, the agent’s utility for high effort over the entire time span
can be written as the sum of expected utilities in each period:
E[U o(e1, e2)] = E[U
o
1 (e1)]+E[U
o
2 (e2)] = α
o+ρu(βofe1)− e1+βofe2− e2 , (4.1)
where u(·) is the concave function introducing the employee’s risk aversion. An
employment contract is incentive-compatible if, in every period, working hard is
at least as good for the agent as not doing so.5 Therefore, the incentive constraints
5We do not account for situations where the principal would require different effort levels
for the two periods. This would considerably complicate an analysis in a discrete model due to
the occurrence of more cases, but it would not create substantially more insights.
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for high effort in Period 1 and 2 are:
E[U o1 (eH)] ≥ E[U o1 (eL =0)]⇔ βo ≥
1
feH
u−1
(
eH
ρ
)
, (4.2)
and
E[U2(eH)] ≥ E[U2(eL =0)]⇔ βofeH − eH ≥ 0⇔ βo ≥ 1
f
. (4.3)
The participation constraint postulates that, in expectancy, the utility over the
entire time span must be at least as large as the utility the agent can derive from
his outside option which is U¯ = 0:
E[U o(eH)] ≥ E[U¯ ]⇔ αo + βofeH + ρu(βofeH)− 2eH ≥ 0 . (4.4)
We restricted the contractual agreement such that the principal has one and
the same bonus factor at hand to steer incentives over the two periods. Hence,
we must identify which of the constraints in (4.2) and (4.3) is binding. As in
a contract with one evaluation, it is the agent’s first-period performance the
principal is likely to forget, he must set higher incentives for effort exertion in
the first period. So (4.2) is the binding incentive constraint, while (4.3) is slack.
Using (4.2), we can now choose the incentive-compatible bonus factor for which
the variable wage bill is the lowest, i.e. βo∗ = 1
feH
u−1( eH
ρ
). One can easily show
that this bonus factor automatically complies with (4.3), as u−1( eH
ρ
) > u−1(eH)
holds. Given the optimal βo∗, the profit maximizing principal will pay the lowest
fixed wage αo that fulfills the participation constraint in (4.4):
αo∗ = eH − u−1( eHρ ) . (4.5)
This optimal fixed wage component is negative, which might seem counterintu-
itive at first sight. Why should a risk-averse agent be willing to enter a contract
that is not only risky but also requires some kind of entry fee? But the negative-
ness of αo∗ can be easily explained by the asymmetry between the two contracting
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periods. The principal steers incentives via one bonus factor, though the periods
are not identical. Due to the principal’s bounded memory and the concavity in
the first-period bonus payment, the agent needs higher incentives to exert effort
in the first than in the second period. However, this implies that incentives for
the second period are too high, the agent is paid more than necessary to be will-
ing to choose eH . It is this rent that the monopsonistic principal reappropriates
when choosing a negative fixed compensation parameter. In a setup where the
employee’s outside option is larger than zero this would imply that an employer
who must pay inefficiently high bonuses to motivate his employees will decide to
cut the fixed wage in turn. With one evaluation, the principal’s expected profit is
the output over the two periods minus the agent’s compensation and minus the
evaluation cost:
E[Πo∗(eH)] = (2f − 1)eH − ρu−1
(
eH
ρ
)
− cE . (4.6)
Under a one-evaluation contract, the agent’s expected compensation is composed
of the fixed payment plus the bonus for the level of performance that is deter-
mined in the evaluation at the end of the second period. Using the incentive-
compatible αo∗ and βo∗ we have derived above, we can specify the principal’s
expected wage bill as:
E[Co∗(eH)] = eH + ρu−1
(
eH
ρ
)
. (4.7)
Comparing the expected compensation to the agent’s disutility of effort, which
is 2eH , leads us to the following result:
Proposition 3 The monetary value of the wage payment strictly exceeds the
agent’s disutiltiy of effort, i.e. E[Co∗(eH)] = eH + ρu−1( eHρ ) > 2eH .
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Proof. The condition comparing (6.9) to 2eH can be simplified as following:
eH + ρu
−1
(
eH
ρ
)
R 2eH ⇔ u−1
(
eH
ρ
)
R eH
ρ
⇔ eH
ρ
R u
(
eH
ρ
)
. (4.8)
As we have assumed a strictly lower utility for risky payments than for non-risky
ones, i.e. u(x) < x ∀ x, it directly follows that eH
ρ
is larger than u( eH
ρ
) and,
therefore, Proposition 3 holds.
The principal has the entire market power, and hence he will pay the agent a
risk premium which sets the expected utility of the agent equal to zero:
E[U o∗(eH)] = eH − u−1
(
eH
ρ
)
+ u−1
(
eH
ρ
)
+ eH − 2eH = 0 . (4.9)
In expectations, offering a one-evaluation contract is profitable to the employer
as long as:
E[Πo(eH)] ≥ 0⇔ f ≥ 1
2eH
[
ρu−1
(
eH
ρ
)
+ cE + eH
]
:= f o . (4.10)
If the agent’s productivity f does not fulfill the inequality in (4.10), the principal
will either choose his outside option or evaluate twice. The threshold f o will be
used later on to characterize competitiveness within the extension to a duopolistic
model in Section 5.2.
4.2.3 Two Evaluations
Having calculated the relevant payoffs for one evaluation, we will now analyze the
outcome of a two-evaluation contract between the principal and his risk-averse
employee. As the principal evaluates at the end of each period, there will be no
loss of information in the evaluation process. Hence, the parameter ρ no longer
plays a role in the equilibrium contract. But since each evaluation comes at a fixed
cost cE, the total evaluation cost increases to 2cE. Analogous to Section 4.2.2,
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we first calculate the conditions under which the agent chooses high effort in
a two-evaluation contract. Subsequently, we will derive the principal’s optimal
behavior and the corresponding profit. In a setting with two evaluations, the
agent’s expected utility over the two periods becomes:
E[U t(e1, e2)] = α
t + u(βtfe1)− e1 + βtfe2 − e2 . (4.11)
The principal’s profit function with two evaluations is composed of his share in
the generated revenue minus the fixed compensation and the doubled evaluation
cost:
E[Πt(e1, e2)] = (1− βt)f(e1 + e2)− αt − 2cE . (4.12)
To derive the incentive-compatible contract parameters in the case of two evalua-
tions, we can use the incentive and participation constraints from Section 4.2.2.
It suffices to change the memory parameter ρ. Setting it equal to one reflects
that the principal has perfect memory, as we have assumed it for the setup with
two evaluations. From condition (4.2), we can analogously derive the optimal
bonus factor βt∗ = 1
feH
u−1(eH). We insert this lowest incentive-compatible bonus
parameter into (4.4) to find the smallest αt for which the participation constraint
is binding:
αt∗ = eH − u−1(eH) . (4.13)
Given the optimal contract parameters, the principal’s profit for a contract that
implements high effort becomes:
E[Πt∗(eH)] = (2f − 1)eH − u−1(eH)− 2cE . (4.14)
Finally, the following condition reflects for which parameter values it is profitable
for the principal to offer an incentive-compatible contract with two evaluations:
E[Πt(eH)] ≥ 0⇔ f ≥ 1
2eH
(u−1(eH) + eH + 2cE):= f t . (4.15)
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Analogous to condition (4.10), the principal will either choose his outside op-
tion or evaluate only once if inequality (4.15) does not hold. Together with the
value f o defined by (4.10), f t will be used as a threshold to define under which
circumstances the heterogenous principals in Section 5.2 face a competitive situ-
ation.
4.2.4 Results and the Impact of Risk Aversion
Knowing the principal’s behavior for each evaluation frequency, it is now possible
to determine when it is preferable for the principal to evaluate once—despite the
fact that this imposes a risk on the agent—and when he wants to evaluate twice.
The following critical condition arises from a comparison of the profit with one
evaluation to the profit with two evaluations:
E[Πo∗(eH)] R E[Πt∗(eH)]⇔ cE R ρu−1
(
eH
ρ
)
− u−1(eH) = c¯E . (4.16)
From this condition, we cannot directly derive whether the right hand side is
strictly larger than zero, i.e. whether there exists a trade-off between the advan-
tages of an additional evaluation and the strictly positive cost this evaluation
entails. But if we use, for example, a logarithmic specification, i.e. u(x) = ln(x),
we find that the right hand side of the inequality exceeds zero as long as ρ is
smaller than one and when values of eH are sufficiently high. The essential rea-
son for such a trade-off to exist is the agent’s attitude towards risk. Let us
assume the agent was risk-neutral and his utility from the bonus payment was
entirely linear, i.e. u(x) = x. It is easy to show that in this case the threshold c¯E
from the condition in (4.16) equals zero. As the evaluation cost is assumed to
be strictly larger than zero, evaluating twice is never optimal when the agent is
risk-neutral.6 Table 4.1 gives an overview of the outcomes chosen by the princi-
6This is in line with the results in Chapter 3 where two evaluations are always a dominated
strategy.
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One Evaluation Two Evaluations
cE > c¯E cE < c¯E
αo/t eH − u−1( eHρ ) eH − u−1(eH)
βo/t 1feH u
−1( eHρ )
1
feH
u−1(eH)
E[Πo/t(eH)] (2f − 1)eH − ρu−1( eHρ )− cE (2f − 1)eH − u−1(eH)− 2cE
E[Πo/t(eH)] ≥ 0 f ≥ 12eH (ρu−1( eHρ ) + eH + cE) f ≥ 12eH (u−1(eH) + eH + 2cE)
Table 4.1: Results with a Risk-Averse Agent
pal and the corresponding values of the compensation variables. Depending on
the critical condition in (4.16), the employer will choose between one and two
evaluations. The first two lines of Table 4.1 give the optimal values of the com-
pensation variables for different evaluation frequencies. The third line contains
the corresponding profits which the principal can realize. Finally, only if at least
one of the profitability constraints, (4.10) and (4.15), in the last line is fulfilled,
the principal will decide to employ the agent.
To get a more precise idea on the implications that the agent’s risk aversion has
on contract design, we would also like to know how the compensation parameters
differ from the results with a risk-neutral agent in Chapter 3. In the following
inequalities, the subscript RN stands for values from a setup where the agent is
risk-neutral and RA stands for the case of a risk-averse agent. Due to u(x) <
x, the principal’s expected profit for one evaluation is strictly lowered by the
introduction of risk aversion on part of the agent:
E[ΠoRA(eH)] < E[Π
o
RN(eH)]⇔ u
(
eH
ρ
)
<
eH
ρ
. (4.17)
For the same reason, variable compensation is larger under risk aversion:
βoRA > β
o
RN ⇔ u
(
eH
ρ
)
<
eH
ρ
, (4.18)
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whereas fixed compensation diminishes:
αoRA < α
o
RN ⇔ u
(
eH
ρ
)
<
eH
ρ
. (4.19)
Analogous effects arise for a two-evaluation contract where the corresponding
inequalities are
E[ΠtRA(eH)] < E[Π
t
RN(eH)]⇔ u(eH) R eH , (4.20)
βtRA > β
t
RN ⇔ u(eH) < eH , (4.21)
and
αtRA < α
t
RN ⇔ u(eH) < eH . (4.22)
Thus, we can conclude that the introduction of the agent’s risk aversion raises
variable compensation whereas fixed compensation is lowered and this is inde-
pendent of the evaluation frequency. At first sight, this result does not seem
intuitive. One would expect lower incentives and higher fixed compensation for a
risk-averse agent. But as the discrete model allows for two effort levels only, i.e.
eL = 0 and eH > 0, the agent cannot adjust optimally by reducing effort and it
is the principal who has to adjust incentives to the given effort levels. Due to the
intertemporal asymmetry, he will also adjust the fixed wage α downwards.
The inequalities in (4.17) and (4.20) show that, compared to a contract with
a risk-neutral agent, the principal’s profit diminishes by a risk premium when he
faces a risk-averse agent. This complies with the standard result that risk aversion
on the part of the agent lowers efficiency.7 We resume the results concerning the
impact of risk aversion in the following proposition:
7The criterion for efficiency in this setting is to maximize the expected surplus Uo + Πo,
which equals the expected profit when the principal is modeled as a monopsonist on the labor
market.
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Proposition 4 In a contract with one (two) evaluation(s), the introduction of
risk aversion on behalf of the agent leads to the following effects:
a) βo/t ↑ (βo/tRA > βo/tRN), i.e. the principal sets higher incentives;
b) αo/t ↓ (αo/tRA < αo/tRN), i.e. the agent receives a lower fixed compensation;
c) E[Πo/t] ↓ (E[Πo/tRA(eH)] < E[Πo/tRN(eH)]), i.e. the principal’s profit which equals
the surplus is diminished.
Beyond the effects induced by risk aversion, we are interested in the impact
of variations in the memory parameter ρ on the compensation parameters in the
case of one evaluation. Comparative statics confirm that αRA rises with better
memory and the bonus factor βRA diminishes:
∂αRA
∂ρ
=
eH
ρ2
u−1ρ
(
eH
ρ
)
> 0 (4.23)
∂βRA
∂ρ
=
1
feH
∂(u−1( eH
ρ
))
∂ρ
= − 1
fρ2
u−1ρ
(
eH
ρ
)
< 0 (4.24)
Both conditions hold because u(x) is an increasing function and, therefore, u−1(·)
is, too.
∂ΠRA
∂ρ
= −u−1( eH
ρ
)− ρ
(
− eH
ρ2
u−1ρ (
eH
ρ
)
)
(4.25)
Finally, it is quite intuitive and one can easily check that the efficiency gains due
to a marginal change in ρ correspond to the marginal decrease in the agents wage
payment:
∂ΠoRA
∂ρ
= −∂CoRA
∂ρ
.
Proposition 5 Independent of the agent’s level of risk aversion, a rise in the
memory parameter ρ, i.e. a better memory capacity of the principal, has the
following effects in a contract with one evaluation:
a) βo ↓, i.e. the principal sets lower incentives when ρ rises;
b) αo ↑, i.e. the agent receives a higher fixed wage.
When the agent is risk-neutral, the expected profit E[Πo] remains unaffected by
changes in ρ, whereas it is strictly lowered when the agent is risk-averse.
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4.3 Discussion and Extensions
In this section we will discuss important assumptions in the basic model and how
some of them can be justified by possible extensions of the setup. The extensions
we propose are the integration of a stochastic shock on output (Section 4.3.2) and
an analysis of the employment contract when the principal as well as the agent
face an infinite time horizon (Section 4.3.3).
4.3.1 Critical Assumptions
The first assumption that might be subject to criticism, is that forgetting means
more precisely ’forgetting good performance’ whereas we never allow the prin-
cipal to remember, so to say to invent, something which has not happened. Of
course, concentrating on the probability of the principal to remember the output
is particularly convenient for modeling. We admit that this is a rather simplistic
way to describe the complex functioning of the human memory but, at the same
time, we believe that allowing for something like ”hallucinations”, i.e. ”remem-
bering” things that never happened, includes very complicated mechanisms of
the mind that should be modeled with a lot of care. When could an employer
remember good performance that has never occurred? This is only plausible if
the employment history of the agent or the impression the employer has got of his
employee suggest that the latter is a good performer. Taking such a pigeonhole
effect into account would add a lot of complexity to the model and even more
assumptions would have to be justified. Though, it does not capture a bias due
to prejudices of the principal concerning the quality of the agent’s performance,
our simple framework gives us at least some first insights into how evaluation
frequency affects incentives if the agent is uncertain whether his performance will
be rewarded or not. Furthermore, interpreting the cause of this uncertainty as
bounded memory is only one possibility. The simplicity of the introduction of
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the bias leaves space for alternative interpretations, which will be discussed in
the conclusion.
A second critical assumption in the basic model refers to the bonus factor β.
We restrict the analysis to contracts where β is equal over the two periods. As it
has already been pointed out to some extent throughout the preceding sections,
this drives a lot of our results. Certainly, this assumption is particularly strong
as contractual freedom should allow the principal to differentiate between the
periods. But on the other hand, it is also plausible to argue that contractual
complexity will be considerably enlarged when allowing for different bonus pa-
rameters. However, we would like to bring forward another argument sustaining
that the restriction is reasonable. What the model actually does, is allowing the
principal to choose one bonus parameter per evaluation period, which comprises
either one or two periods. Although he could pick different βt in a contract with
two evaluations he would never do so. The two periods are identical and, there-
fore, the optimal βt∗ are as well. So altogether, we do not generally prohibit a
differentiation between periods, but we say that a differentiation of the bonus
factors with respect to the evaluation periods is rather unrealistic due to contrac-
tual complexity. And this is one reason why fewer evaluations do not only lower
evaluation cost, but also raise the cost of providing incentives.
4.3.2 Model with a Stochastic Shock
A model version incorporating moral hazard can be found in the appendix to this
chapter. In this modification, we assume that the principal can only observe the
output generated by the agent which is affected by an unobservable stochastic
shock. As the extension gives us relatively few additional insights, we will only
discuss some main results at this point. Some of the results are quite straight-
forward, e.g the fact that the bonus of the agent must increase—the evaluation
frequency being irrelevant—compared to the setup without the shock. Not only
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bounded memory is a risk for his bonus payment, but also the output might not
even materialize and, consequently, with some positive probability no bonus will
be paid at all, even though the employee has put forth the required level of effort.
With an additional source of risk, it becomes even harder to make a valid
statement on the optimal evaluation frequency. For a logarithmic specification of
the utility function, one can show that a one-evaluation contract does not domi-
nate the two-evaluation contract regardless of the evaluation cost. Depending on
the parametrization of the model and the shape of the agent’s utility function,
evaluations will be more or less frequent with the stochastic shock than without
its occurrence.
Two effects are at work and their extent depends on the shape of the utility
function as well as the chosen parameters. First, the possibility that there is no
revenue, despite the fact that the agent has exerted effort, lowers the value of
the evaluation. The principal cannot differentiate between situations in which
the agent has not exerted effort and in which there is no output due to the
shock. Therefore, evaluations become less important, because now the event
where the principal forgets to pay a bonus occurs with a lower probability. The
probability for this state to emerge is the joint probability of two events. High
output must realize and at the same time, the principal must forget that this event
has happened. Second, compared to the setup with a deterministic production
technology, the optimal bonus payment is larger with the stochastic shock. Thus,
if a revenue is generated and the principal forgets to pay the bonus, the damage
for the agent is large.
4.3.3 Infinite Horizon
So far, we have assumed that the employer will stick to the contract he has
offered, although some information in this contract is not verifiable for third
parties, especially not for a court. In economic modeling, for such an implicit
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contract to be stable, the expected gain from the persistence of the contractual
relationship must be large enough to prevent the employer from cheating on the
agent. Cheating here means a deviation from the terms of the implicit contract,
e.g. paying a lower or no bonus and skipping evaluations specified in the contract.
Formally, a stable implicit contract is characterized by a situation where the
expected gain from a one-time deviation from the implicit contract E[ΠD] is
equal or lower than the expected gain from sticking to what has been agreed
upon, E[ΠIC ], now and in the future. This can be summarized in the following
stability condition:
E[ΠD] ≤
(
1 +
1
r
)
E[ΠIC ]⇔ r ≤ E
[
ΠIC
ΠD − ΠIC
]
:= rcrit , (4.26)
where r is the employer’s interest rate. If he discounts strongly due to a high
interest rate, the termination of the beneficiary employment relationship with
the agent does not prevent the principal from deviating and exploiting the agent.
The same is true for high gains from this deviation, i.e. ΠD − ΠIC is large.
Depending on the evaluation frequency that has been chosen, one can select
the proper E[ΠIC ] from equation (4.6) or (4.14). It is harder to select an appro-
priate value for the expected gain from a deviation. Hence, we will choose two
extreme scenarios here, where evaluations are not contractible and no bonuses
will be paid. So when he deviates, the principal will skip the last evaluation, as
it is costly. In a two-evaluation contract, he will still conduct an evaluation after
the first period, otherwise the agent would become suspicious and stop working
hard after the first period.8 If one of the following two critical values is larger
than the principal’s interest rate r, there exists an implicit contract that is stable
8More possible scenarios for deviations on behalf of the principal are discussed in Sec-
tion 4.5.2 in the Appendix to this chapter.
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for the corresponding evaluation frequency:
ro2 =
2feH−eH−ρu−1( eHρ )−cE
(1+ρ)u−1( eH
ρ
)+cE
,
rt2 =
2feH−eH−u−1(eH)−2cE
2u−1(eH)+cE
.
(4.27)
Obviously, the two thresholds are strictly positive for beneficial relationships. A
rise in the evaluation cost clearly lowers the value of the thresholds, so implicit
contracting becomes more difficult.
4.4 Conclusion
In the present chapter, a principal with bounded memory faces a trade-off con-
cerning the choice of evaluation frequency when the agent is risk-averse. Depend-
ing on the cost of an additional evaluation, it might be worthwhile for an employer
to increase evaluations as this allows to lower variable compensation. Whereas,
in a model with a risk-neutral agent (Chapter 3) more frequent evaluations are
superfluous—they simply increase the fixed cost without yielding any benefit—in
a model with risk aversion more evaluations can even enhance efficiency through
the elimination of risk within the evaluation process. By absorbing the effect of
the principal’s memory imperfection, they eliminate the efficiency loss due to risk
imposed on the agent.
The existence of the trade-off is relatively robust to a setup featuring a stochas-
tic shock on output. Whether a principal should evaluate more or less often when
there is a shock crucially depends on the specification of the model. Two opposite
effects are at work. On the one hand, the possibility that there is no revenue,
despite the agent exerting effort, lowers the value of the evaluation. On the other
hand, the bonus payment is larger in the setup with the stochastic shock. Con-
sequently, if a revenue is generated and the principal forgets to pay the bonus,
the damage for the agent is larger than without the stochastic shock.
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The performance measure we use in the model can be considered a subjective
measure. In Section 4.3.3, we discuss conditions for the stability of the optimal
contracts we propose, based on the analysis of the basic model. Stability of the
implicit contracts certainly depends on the parameter choice. We find a clear
negative impact of the evaluation cost on stability, whereas the effect of other
variables depends on the specification of the model.
4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Basic Model with a Stochastic Shock
Up to now, if the agent exerted high effort, this automatically resulted in high
output, i.e. pi(eH) = f · eH = piH . In this section, the model will be enriched
by a stochastic shock. High effort only improves the agent’s chance to produce
high output. Due to a stochastic shock, a hard-working agent can be unlucky
and produce low output. Likewise, a lazy agent can be lucky and produce high
output without having exerted effort. This is modeled in the following way: If
an agent exerts high effort, he will generate a high benefit piH with probability
p(eH) = pH and a low benefit piL = 0 with probability (1 − pH). Low effort, i.e.
eL = 0, generates the high benefit piH only with probability p(eL) = pL < pH and,
therefore, implies a larger probability (1− pL) to produce piL = 0. Whenever he
generates piH > 0, the agent is paid a bonus, no matter the effort he has shown.
Again, we will compare a situation where the principal evaluates only once with
a setup where there are two evaluations.
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One Evaluation
The agent’s expected utility from the contract is
E[U o(e1, e2)] = α
o + ρp(e1)u(β
opiH)− e1 + p(e2)βopiH − e2 . (4.28)
Comparing his payoffs with high and low effort respectively yields the following
incentive compatible bonus factors:
E[U o1 (eH)] ≥ E[U o1 (eL =0)]⇔ βo ≥
1
piH
u−1
(
k
ρ
)
(4.29)
and
E[U2(eH)] ≥ E[U2(eL =0)]⇔ βo ≥ 1
piH
k , (4.30)
where k := eH
pH−pL . To ensure that the agent prefers working to his outside option
E[U o(eH)] ≥ E[U¯ ]⇔ αo + ρpHu(βopiH) + pHβopiH − 2eH ≥ 0 (4.31)
must equally hold. As we allow only for one bonus factor, the principal must
choose the factor resulting from (4.29) to ensure hight effort in both periods. So,
this first condition is tight, whereas (4.3) is slack. A contract offer that fulfills
αo ≥ 2eH − pH
[
k + u−1(
k
ρ
)
]
(4.32)
can ensure the participation of the principal. Given the optimal contract param-
eters αo∗ and βo∗, the principal’s expected profit equals
E[Πo∗(eH)] = 2(pHpiH − eH) + pH
[
k − ρu−1
(
k
ρ
)]
− cE . (4.33)
The agent’s expected compensation amounts to
E[Co∗(eH)] = 2eH + pH
[
ρu−1
(
k
ρ
)
− k
]
(4.34)
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and outweighs the monetary value of his effort. But due to his risk aversion, his
expected utility equals zero:
E[U o∗(eH)] = 2eH − pH
[
k + u−1
(
k
ρ
)]
+ pH
[
k + u−1
(
k
ρ
)]
− 2eH = 0 . (4.35)
Finally, it is important to point out that there exists a critical threshold for the
level of revenues that must be respected for the employment relationship to be
profitable in a one-evaluation setup:
E[Πo(eH)] ≥ 0⇔ piH ≥ 12pH
(
2eH + pH
[
ρu−1
(
k
ρ
)
− k
]
+ cE
)
:= f o. (4.36)
Two Evaluations
With two evaluations, the agent’s utility can be described by
E[U t(e1, e2)] = α
t + p(e1)u(β
tpi1)− e1 + p(e2)βtpi2 − e2 , (4.37)
whereas the principal’s expected profit is
E[Πt(e1, e2)] = 2pHpiH − αt − (p(e1) + p(e2))βtpiH − 2cE . (4.38)
The optimal bonus factor βt∗ can be calculated from (4.29) by setting ρ = 1 and
the following αt∗ ensures the agent’s participation:
αt∗ = 2eH − pH [k + u−1(k)] . (4.39)
The equilibrium profit hence amounts to
E[Πt∗(eH)] = 2pHpiH − 2eH + pH [k − u−1(k)]− 2cE . (4.40)
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For the contract to be signed, this profit must be larger than zero in expectations:
E[Πt(eH)] ≥ 0⇔ piH ≥ 1
2pH
[
2eH + pH [u
−1(k)− k] + 2cE
]
:= f t . (4.41)
Results and the Impact of Risk Aversion
The introduction of a second source of risk, namely a stochastic shock on output,
has an impact on the trade-off between one and two evaluations:
E[Πo∗(eH)] R E[Πt∗(eH)]
cE R pH
[
ρu−1
(
k
ρ
)
− u−1(k)
]
:= cˆE .
(4.42)
The behavior of cˆE to changes in the parameters pH , k, and ρ depends on the
particular specification of the model. For a logarithmic specification of u(x), one
can show that the left hand side of the inequality strictly exceeds zero as long
as k > 1. In this case, the amount of the evaluation cost is decisive for the choice
of the evaluation frequency. Even if we take the logarithmic specification as given,
it still depends on the chosen parameters whether risk aversion makes evaluations
more or less desirable. The explanation for the effect of the stochastic shock being
ambiguous is that, on the one hand, it lowers the value of an evaluation as with
some positive probability no bonus will be paid, despite the evaluation having
occurred and the agent having exerted effort. On the other hand, the damage
for the agent is larger when he is not being paid due to the principal’s bounded
memory, as the bonus in the setup with the stochastic shock is larger.
4.5.2 Deviation Scenarios for the Principal
If the principal wants to cheat on the agent in a one-evaluation contract, two sce-
narios are imaginable. First, one could suppose that evaluations are contractible
CHAPTER 4. RISK-AVERSE AGENTS 84
and, therefore, the principal cannot skip the scheduled evaluation at the end of
the second period. Also, pretending to evaluate truthfully still comes at cost cE.
Then, the cheating consists in the fact that he forges the evaluation such that it
does not plan any bonus for the agent’s work in the two preceding periods, even
though the agent has exerted high effort. So by deviating, he can save the money
for the bonus, but not the evaluation cost. In a second scenario, evaluations are
not contractible and the principal skips both, the evaluation itself and the pay-
ment of the bonus. For those scenarios, we will derive the critical interest rates ro1
and ro2.
When we look at two-evaluation contracts, even more scenarios become pos-
sible. But, we think, the four we will identify here are quite exhaustive. All
the deviations we consider have in common that the bonus corresponding to the
second period will never be paid. In the first two scenarios, we presume that the
principal will not pay any bonus. More precisely, the first scenario is analogous to
the first scenario in the one-evaluation contract. As evaluations are contractible,
the principal must conduct them, but he will not pay any bonus although he
promised to do so. For a second scenario, one could imagine that evaluations are
not contractible, but the agent will become suspicious if the principal skips the
first evaluation. So he must at least evaluate and bear the corresponding cost
after the first period, but afterwards, he will pay no bonus for either period and
he does not evaluate a second time.
After all, we consider the following two scenarios to be more plausible. Still,
the first evaluation is conducted, either because it is contractible or because the
agent could otherwise learn that the principal is cheating. But the agent also
learns the content of the evaluation and that information is contractible. So in a
third scenario, the corresponding bonus becomes verifiable information after the
first evaluation. Hence, if the principal cheated on the first-period bonus, the
agent would learn it and, therefore, stop providing high effort. In this situation,
the principal would be reluctant to cheat in the first period. When he deviates
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from the implicit contract, he has the entire revenue, but he pays only half the
bonus and half the evaluation cost. A forth and last scenario we would like to
tackle is similar to the second one under two evaluations, but also, once the
first-period evaluation has been made, the agent learns the result and the bonus
becomes contractible. We can find critical interest rates rti , with i = 1, 2, 3, 4
that correspond to each of these scenarios. The following list contains the critical
interest rates for one and two evaluations:
ro1 =
2feH − eH − ρu−1( eHρ )− cE
(1 + ρ)u−1( eH
ρ
)
,
ro2 =
2feH − eH − ρu−1( eHρ )− cE
(1 + ρ)u−1( eH
ρ
) + cE
,
rt1 =
2feH − eH − u−1(eH)− 2cE
2u−1(eH)
,
rt2 =
2feH − eH − u−1(eH)− 2cE
2u−1(eH) + cE
,
rt3 =
2feH − eH − u−1(eH)− 2cE
u−1(eH)
,
rt4 =
2feH − eH − u−1(eH)− 2cE
u−1(eH) + cE
.
For both evaluation frequencies, the second threshold represents the strongest
requirement to the relationship because the gains from a deviation are the highest
is these scenarios. These are the scenarios discussed in Section 4.3.3.
Chapter 5
Competition for Workers
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we extend the model from Chapter 4 to consider differences in the
principal’s degree of forgetfulness. It seems unlikely that the parameter repre-
senting forgetfulness is equal for all employers. Therefore, we analyze a situation
where heterogeneously forgetful principals compete for an agent. Competition be-
tween principals places the employee in the stronger position. While in a classical
principal-agent model the employer makes a contract offer that sets the agent in-
different between signing it or not, the competitive market situation enables the
agent to extract a positive utility.1
For two competing principals, the model is extended to a situation where one
principal has a potential advantage due to a better memory capacity. The agent
will choose to work for the principal who offers the most attractive contract. In a
competitive setup with heterogeneous principals, we can show that the advantage
we expected turns out to be relevant. The less forgetful principal is able to make
1Examples from the literature for competition between principals are Phelan (1995) (iden-
tical principals) and Manoli and Sannikov (2005) (heterogeneous principals).
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a positive profit if one evaluation is chosen, and the more his competitor forgets,
the larger this share of the surplus will be.
5.2 The Duopoly Setup
Having solved the basic model with a risk-averse agent, we will now extend the
setup to a situation with two heterogeneously forgetful principals who compete
for the labor of one agent.2 The principals need the agent to produce output
and the agent can only work for one of them, whilst the loser of the competition
makes zero profit. In the following, principal j is more forgetful than principal i,
i.e. ρi > ρj. To characterize the behavior of the competing employers, we must
take a closer look at the options they have. Both principals will only make
contract offers that create a positive expected surplus. Consequently, only when
there exists at least one contract—with one or with two evaluations—for which
the agent’s productivity f is sufficiently high, the agent will be employed by
one of the principals. As the critical profitability threshold belonging to a one-
evaluation contract depends on the memory parameter ρ—exactly the parameter
the principals differ in—we can state the following lemma on the corresponding
thresholds:
Lemma 1 The critical profitability threshold for a contract with one evaluation
defined by (4.10) is strictly lower for principal i than the corresponding threshold
for principal j, i.e. f o(ρj) := f
o
j > f
o(ρi) := f
o
i .
The proof is delegated to the appendix. The intuition of the preceding lemma
is as follows: If a contract with one evaluation generates a positive surplus for
2The duopoly setup can be interpreted as a situation where some employers are able to
generate signals on their ability to remember and can therefore build up heterogenous reputa-
tions of recruiting supervisors with strong memory capacities. Alternatively, the competition
could take place between different departments within a firm. In this case it is plausible that
employees have information on the memory capacities of supervisors in the departments.
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principal i, this does not imply that the same is true for principal j. But the
reverse implication—if a contract with one evaluation generates a positive surplus
for principal j, the same holds for principal i—is true. Contracts with two evalua-
tions generate identical surpluses for both principals. Hence, for an employment
relationship to be established, at least one of the inequalities f ≥ f t and f ≥ f oi
must be true.
The chronology of the events in the two-principal setup is similar to the order
of moves when there is only one employer. The main difference is that now
not one but two employers simultaneously make a contract offer to the agent in
Period 0. When they make their contract offers, the principals must consider
their competitor’s potential, i.e. profitable strategies and the criteria on which
the agent will base his choice. To structure the following analysis, we will look
at three important cases which are specified according to the available contract
offers that create a positive surplus. We do not consider situations where only
one principal can make an acceptable contract offer, i.e. we will only consider
parameter constellations with competition between the employers.
The comparison of the thresholds shows us, which contract offer can realize the
highest profits and who can, therefore, make the highest wage offer in competition.
The lower the threshold, the higher the profit the corresponding contract yields.
For the analysis, it is only important to look at contracts with thresholds that are
below the agent’s productivity f , because otherwise, the principal will make a loss
when offering the contract. Furthermore, for each principal, only the threshold
corresponding to the highest possible wage offer he can make is relevant. This
allows us to restrict the analysis to three relevant competitive cases that are
displayed in Table 5.2. An exhaustive characterization of possible cases can be
found in the appendix.
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Case Productivity Thresholds Evaluation(s)
A f ≥ f oj ∧ f t > f oj One
B f ≥ f t ∧ f oi < f t Two
C f ≥ f t ∧ f oj > f t > f oi One
Table 5.1: Overview of the Cases and their Characteristics
5.2.1 Case A: Only One-Evaluation Contracts
This case considers all situations where the most gainful contract either principal
can offer is a contract with one evaluation. To derive the equilibrium outcome
in case of competition between principals who offer one-evaluation contracts,
we start by setting principal j’s expected profit from an incentive-compatible
contract equal to zero. To do so, we use βo∗ = 1
feH
u−1( eH
ρ
), as the entire amount
of the wage payment can be adjusted via the participation constraint, while the
incentive constraints in (4.2) and (4.3) continue to be fulfilled. Solving for αoi
yields the highest fixed payment principal j can pay without making a loss:
E[Πoj(eH)]
!
= 0⇔ αoj = 2feH − (1 + ρj)u−1
(
eH
ρj
)
− cE . (5.1)
Given this αoj and zero profit for principal j, the agent’s expected utility when
working for j is:
E[U oj (eH |Πoj(eH) = 0)] = 2feH − ρju−1
(
eH
ρj
)
− eH − cE . (5.2)
His expected utility when employed by principal i is given by:
E[U oi (eH)] = α
o
i + u
−1
(
eH
ρi
)
− eH . (5.3)
To contract the agent, principal i must offer the agent an expected utility that
is at least as large as the one he could possibly receive from principal j when
the latter is making an expected profit of zero. So by setting (5.2) equal to (5.3)
we can derive a critical fixed payment αo∗i for which the employee is indifferent
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between working for i and working for j:
αo∗i = 2feH − u−1
(
eH
ρi
)
− ρju−1
(
eH
ρj
)
− cE . (5.4)
If principal i sets αo∗i according to (5.4), the agent is ready to work for him and
his profit is:
E[Πo∗i (eH)] = ρju
−1
(
eH
ρj
)
− ρiu−1
(
eH
ρi
)
. (5.5)
Of course, we are interested whether this profit can be positive and when this is
the case. Proposition 6 states that the less forgetful principal can actually make
a strictly positive profit:
Proposition 6 Given that there is competition and contracts with one evalua-
tion yield the highest surplus, the following holds: The agent accepts working for
principal i under a one-evaluation contract that makes him indifferent between
working for one or the other principal (E[U oi (eH)] = E[U
o
j (eH)]) and which leaves
principal j with a profit of zero (E[Πoj(eH)] = 0). Principal i, the principal with
the better memory, expects to realize a strictly positive profit (Πoi (eH) > 0).
Proof. The profit in (5.5) already takes principal j’s zero-profit condition and the
indifference of the agent into account. So we only need to prove that Πoi (eH) >
0 which can be reformulated as ρju
−1( eH
ρj
) > ρiu
−1( eH
ρi
). As this is the same
inequality as in (5.13) the further proof is identical to the one of Lemma 1.
When the offer complies with (5.4), the agent’s expected utility from working
for principal i is:
E[U oi (eH)] = 2feH − ρju−1
(
eH
ρj
)
− eH − cE . (5.6)
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Note that his utility only depends on ρj but is independent of his employer’s
degree of forgetfulness ρi. For the surplus, we obtain the opposite result:
E[Soi (eH)] = 2feH − ρiu−1
(
eH
ρi
)
− eH − cE . (5.7)
Thus, the surplus is a function of the actual employer’s memory parameter only.
This is quite logical, as ρi induces the risk the agent has to bear despite his risk
aversion. On the other hand, ρj leaves the surplus unaffected, but it determines
the actual split which employer i can negotiate, and this again depends on the
agent’s outside option with principal j as employer. The surplus is identical to
the principal’s profit from equation (4.6) in the non-competitive setup.
The agent’s expected compensation is:
E[Co(eH)] = 2feH + ρiu
−1
(
eH
ρi
)
− ρju−1
(
eH
ρj
)
− cE . (5.8)
As in (6.9), the monetary value the expected compensation has for the principal
exceeds the expected disutility of effort of the agent.
5.2.2 Case B: Only Two-Evaluation Contracts
In this case, a contract with two evaluations offered by either principal generates
the highest surplus. It is possible, that profitability is also given for contracts
with one evaluation, but such a contract will never be offered as it can always
be overbid by a contract with two evaluations. If only two-evaluation contracts
play a role, the surplus at stake is independent of ρ and the two principals can
offer the same range of profitable two-evaluation contracts. As the principals
compete in the amount of the wage payment for a given level of effort, it is
reasonable to apply a Bertrand argumentation here. If one principal makes a
contract offer with an expected wage payment w that leaves him in expectations
with a positive profit, the other principal can still offer a slightly higher wage
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w + ² and contract the agent. This is true until the chosen wage scheme induces
an expected profit of zero. As both employers anticipate this overbidding a` la
Bertrand, they offer contracts with the same wage scheme which makes them
indifferent between employing the agent and not producing. Consequently, the
agent who faces such contracts is indifferent which of the two he will sign.
Due to the perfect preservation of the performance information in an employ-
ment relationship with two evaluations, forgetfulness plays no role in the follow-
ing calculus. The principals are symmetric again, and we can skip the indexes i
and j for the compensation variables. Using the incentive-compatible bonus fac-
tor βt∗ = 1
feH
u−1(eH) from Section 4.2.3 we can derive the fixed payment αt∗ that
leads to zero expected profit for the contracting principal:
E[Πt(eH)]
!
= 0⇔ αt∗ = 2[feH − u−1(eH)− cE] . (5.9)
Given these compensation parameters, the agent’s expected utility for two evalua-
tions is:
E[U t∗(eH)] = αt∗ + u(βt∗feH) + βt∗feH − 2eH
= 2feH − eH − u−1(eH)− 2cE .
(5.10)
This corresponds to the principal’s expected profit in Section 4.2.3.
5.2.3 Case C: One Evaluation by Principal i, Two by j
This last case considers a situation where the contract yielding the highest surplus
is a one-evaluation contract with principal i. At the same time, principal j can
offer a profitable contract with two evaluations. Hence, the agent has an outside
option when negotiating with principal i. We can take the expected utility the
agent gets when working for principal j from equation (5.10) in Case B. Now, the
wage offer by principal i for a contract with one evaluation must at least give the
CHAPTER 5. COMPETITION FOR WORKERS 93
agent the same expected utility:
E[U oi (eH)] = E[U
t(eH |Πt(eH) = 0)]
⇔ αo∗i = (2f − 1)eH − u−1
(
eH
ρi
)
− 2cE .
(5.11)
Principal i’s profit with such a contract is:
E[Πo∗(eH)] = eH − ρu−1
(
eH
ρ
)
+ cE . (5.12)
Again, the surplus, i.e. the sum of (5.10) and (5.12), is identical to the principal’s
profit from equation (4.6) in the non-competitive setup.
5.2.4 Results from the Duopoly Setup
By analyzing the cases A to C, we have characterized the interplay of two prin-
cipals who differ in their memory capacity. They are the only cases featuring a
strictly competitive situation. Our findings in these cases are quite intuitive. The
principal who has a better memory can only benefit from his advantage when a
contract with one evaluation is efficient. In this case, the surplus is divided be-
tween this principal and the agent. When it is efficient to evaluate twice, the
entire surplus goes to the agent, as the principals are homogeneous in their offers.
Compared to Section 4.2.3, where the principal has the entire market power, the
surplus is unchanged. Only its distribution varies when market power is shifted
to the agent.
In this formal analysis, we have considered a risk-averse agent. Intuitively,
the outcome of the model with a risk-neutral agent is quite straightforward. The
agent has the entire market power in the duopoly setup with two principals, as
the latter will overbid their respective compensation offers until both make zero
profits. With risk neutrality, the surplus at stake is independent of the degree of
forgetfulness. Therefore, the principals’ heterogeneity offers no advantage to the
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less forgetful one, i.e. if principal i gets zero profit from an offer, the same offer
implies zero profit for principal j and the other way around. Although, we have
assumed an asymmetry in forgetfulness the outcome is symmetric. The agent is
indifferent between working for principal i or working for j and receives the entire
surplus.
5.3 Conclusion
The extension to a duopoly setup under risk aversion does not change the decision
on the optimal evaluation frequency. In cases A and C, the principal who has
the better memory capacity has an advantage over his competitor. When the
agent is only offered a contract with one evaluation, he decides to work for the
less forgetful principal and the latter can realize a strictly positive profit. The
more the competitor forgets, the larger this share of the surplus will be. Since
the distribution of market power does not affect the evaluation frequency chosen,
efficiency is preserved in the duopoly framework.
5.4 Appendix
5.4.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The inequality in the lemma can be reformulated as:
ρju
−1
(
eH
ρj
)
> ρiu
−1
(
eH
ρi
)
. (5.13)
To show that this holds, we prove that the derivative of ρu−1( eH
ρ
) with respect
to ρ is negative. This is sufficient as
∂(ρu−1( eH
ρ
))
∂ρ
< 0 implies that ρju
−1( eH
ρj
) must
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be larger than ρiu
−1( eH
ρi
) and, therefore, Πoi (eH) > 0 is true. The derivative is:
∂(u−1( eH
ρ
))
∂ρ
= u−1( eH
ρ
) + ρu−1ρ (
eH
ρ
) · (− eH
ρ2
)
= u−1( eH
ρ
)− eH
ρ
· u−1ρ ( eHρ ) ,
(5.14)
where u−1ρ (·) stands for the first derivative of the inverse utility function with
respect to ρ. Now the condition
∂(ρu−1( eH
ρ
))
∂ρ
< 0 can be written as:
∂(ρu−1( eH
ρ
))
∂ρ
< 0 ⇔ u−1( eH
ρ
)− eH
ρ
· u−1ρ ( eHρ ) < 0
⇔ u
−1( eH
ρ
)
eH
ρ
< u−1ρ (
eH
ρ
) .
(5.15)
Since it is the inverse of the concave function u(·), the function u−1(·) is convex.
Therefore, the inequality in (5.15) holds.
5.4.2 Division into Cases
Case 1: f < f t: This case contains three subcases of which only the last one is
really interesting.
• Case 1.1: f oj > f oi > f
• Case 1.2: f oj > f ≥ f oi
• Case 1.3: f ≥ f oj > f oi
Case 2: f ≥ f t: Contains all situations where two evaluations are profitable and
it is subdivided into three groups of subcases:
• Case 2.1: f oi > f t
- Case 2.1.1: f oj > f
o
i > f ≥ f t
- Case 2.1.2: f oj > f ≥ f oi > f t
- Case 2.1.3: f ≥ f oj > f oi > f t
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• Case 2.2: f oj > f t > f oi
- Case 2.2.1: f oj > f ≥ f t > f oi
- Case 2.2.2: f ≥ f oj > f t > f oi
• Case 2.3: f ≥ f t > f oj > f oi
The comparison of the thresholds shows us which contract offer can realize the
highest profits and, therefore, who can make the highest wage offer in a competi-
tive situation. The lower the threshold, the higher the profit the corresponding
contract yields. For the analysis, it is only important to look at contracts with
thresholds that are below the agent’s productivity f , because otherwise, the prin-
cipal would make a loss when offering the contract. Furthermore, for each prin-
cipal only the threshold corresponding to the highest possible wage offer he can
make is relevant. This allows us to reduce the analysis to three different cases:
• Case A: f ≥ f oj ∧ f t > f oj
• Case B: f ≥ f t ∧ f oi > f t
• Case C: f ≥ f t ∧ f oj > f t > f oi
Case A is the situation where the two contracts with one evaluation offered by
the principals are the most gainful proposals available. This case contains the
cases 1.3—the only situation that can be labeled competitive in Case 1, where it
is profitable for both principals to offer a contract with one evaluation—and 2.3.
The first and the second subcase of Case 1 are of minor interest. In Case 1.1,
none of the principals can offer a gainful contract so the agent will be employed
by neither. In the second subcase, only principal i can offer a contract the agent
might accept. Only one gainful contract exists: A contract proposed by principal i
which contains one evaluation. Principal i will offer a contract that guarantees
the agent an expected utility equal to zero. The analysis is therefore identical to
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what has been treated in Section 4.2.2. Since the agent’s only outside option is
refusing to work, the employer can appropriate the entire surplus.
Case 2.1 and all its subcases refer to situations where two evaluations are
always more profitable than one. Therefore the principals compete offering two-
evaluation contracts. These cases are resumed in Case B. The third important
case, Case C, contains cases where the contract offering the highest surplus is a
one-evaluation contract by principal i. The second-best option is a contract offer
with two evaluations. This is true for all cases belonging to 2.2.
Chapter 6
Heterogenous Agents
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate the effect of heterogeneity of workers on optimal
evaluation frequency. In particular, we want to find out whether employers should
evaluate all of their employees at the same frequency or whether it can be op-
timal to offer contracts with differing evaluation frequencies at the same time.
We consider a situation with two types of employees: For one of them it is more
costly to produce a given level of output than for the other type of employee. So,
potential employees indirectly differ in their productivity. This characteristic is
not observable for the employer who wants to hire an agent. It is private infor-
mation to the employee. Thus, the employer could offer contracts with different
evaluation frequencies to screen the agents despite the information asymmetry.
This is possible as the frequency of evaluations is directly linked to incentives
because it enhances the accuracy of the outcome of the evaluation and, hence,
reduces the risk attached to possible bonus payments.
Again, we motivate the increase of accuracy through more evaluations by a
memory bias on behalf of the supervisor. The longer the period between the
98
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creation of output and the judgment of its value, the less likely the supervisor
is to remember the real value of the output correctly. So the payoff of more
evaluations comes through their impact on incentives. The more precisely an
evaluation reflects the actual performance of an agent, the higher the probability
that a high output will be valued through a bonus and, consequently, the higher
the incentives to deliver such output. Of course, the results of the model apply to
any situation where the quality of the evaluation outcome increases in evaluation
frequency.
More frequent evaluations should not only lead to more precise evaluation
outcomes, but they are very likely to be more costly at the same time. So, in a
first step, the employer must trade off the cost of additional evaluations against
their indirect payoff through stronger incentives. Furthermore, the existence of
asymmetric information might encourage him to adjust the evaluation frequency
to an optimal screening policy. Agents with high productivity might prefer to
be evaluated more often as the loss they suffer due to a less accurate evaluation
is larger than the one of a less productive agent. In contrast, low-productivity
agents loose more, when choosing a high evaluation frequency as the indirect
evaluation cost they incur through a lower fixed wage pays off relatively less for
them.
We capture the principal’s decision problem in a model inspired by Moen and
Rose´n (2005). The authors analyze the screening of heterogeneously productive
agents who are evaluated on the basis of a distorted performance measure, i.e. a
measure reacting differently to two separate tasks. In turn, our analysis proceeds
analogously, but it refers to two different periods rather than tasks. Due to
the employer’s memory bias, the measured performance is the less distorted the
more often an agent is evaluated. So, in terms of Moen and Rose´n (2005), more
frequent evaluations soften the underlying distortion. Of course, this comes at a
cost, as total evaluation cost increases with an additional evaluation. The present
model investigates in particular, which contracts an employer will offer when he
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is incompletely informed about the agents’ productivity. He only knows the
distribution of types but cannot tell the type of an agent he faces when making
a contract offer.
We find that an employer will never offer contracts with different evaluation
frequencies when information about the agents’ type is symmetric. In this case,
the choice of the optimal evaluation frequency is independent of the type and all
agents should be evaluated at the same rate. When we come to the analysis of a
situation in which information about his type is private to the agent, this result
is only weakened under some restrictions. In the general model, screening will
only be realized by the use of the compensation parameters. This is the case as
the optimal evaluation frequency is independent of the type. When the principal
has two parameters at hand to differentiate contracts, namely the compensation
parameters, this will be sufficient for optimal screening. Screening contracts that
differentiate with respect to evaluation frequency are always outperformed by
one of the screening contracts with equal evaluation frequency. Also, pooling
heterogenous agents will never be an equilibrium.
Only when contract design is subject to restrictions, such as the obligation to
compensate employee performance in an equal way, screening by the use of diffe-
rent evaluation frequencies can be worthwhile. In this case, the use of evaluation
frequencies as a screening device can become an equilibrium strategy for an unin-
formed principal. If the variation of bonus factors between groups of employees is
precluded, equal evaluation frequencies automatically imply pooling of the agents.
Depending on the distribution of the respective types in the population and other
exogenous factors, both pooling contracts as well as both contracts that screen
via evaluation frequency can become an equilibrium offer for the principal.
In Section 6.2, we extend the basic model of Moen and Rose´n (2005) to a setup
where a forgetful monopsonistic employer can decide on the evaluation frequency
for his employees. We extend the analysis to a model with heterogeneous agents in
CHAPTER 6. HETEROGENOUS AGENTS 101
Section 6.3 and investigate possible contract offers with asymmetric information
in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 concludes this chapter.
6.2 The Model with Homogenous Workers
The model we propose in this section is strongly related to a framework proposed
by Moen and Rose´n (2005). In a labor market, a principal contracts with risk-
neutral agents to produce an output. Note that contrary to Moen and Rose´n
(2005), we assume the principal to have monopsony power. First, we look at
homogenous workers who all have the same cost of effort provision. Second, we
extend the model to heterogenous workers in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. The principal
offers two-period contracts to workers who produce a stochastic output that is
worth
pi = e1 + e2 + ε , (6.1)
where e1 and e2 is the level of effort in period t = 1, 2, and ε is a symmetric random
shock on output with mean zero.1 As the principal has bounded memory, the
value of output he observes is
p˜i = ρ e1 + e2 + ε := e˜+ ε . (6.2)
The factor ρ represents the probability of the principal to remember an agent’s
output. It is updated to one, if the principal makes an evaluation at the end of
the first period, otherwise ρ lies somewhere between zero and one, i.e. ρ ∈ ]0, 1[.
Agents face a convex effort cost which is additively separable in periods:
C(e1, e2) =
(e1 − e0)2
2
+
(e2 − e0)2
2
, (6.3)
1For a more precise interpretation, ε is the sum of two identically distributed shocks occurring
in each period. There are no stochastic dependencies between periods.
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for e1, e2 ≥ e0. An agent’s utility is composed of his expected wage payment
minus the effort cost:
E[U(e1, e2)] = E[w(e˜)]− C(e1, e2) . (6.4)
As the wage payment will be based upon the observed aggregate output p˜i, the
agent will choose an effort combination (e1, e2) such that he minimizes his overall
effort cost for a given aggregate effort level e˜. In expectations, this corresponds
to the following minimization problem:
min
e1,e2
[
(e1 − e0)2
2
+
(e2 − e0)2
2
]
s. t. ρ e1 + e2 = e˜ , (6.5)
where e˜ is also the expected output to be observed. The solution to the problem
can be characterized by the equation
e2 − e0
e1 − e0 =
1
ρ
. (6.6)
So independent of the observed level of output, the worker will optimally choose
to exert more effort in period two than in period one as long as ρ is not equal to
one, i.e. e1 < e2 for ρ ∈ ]0, 1[. Following the approach of Moen and Rose´n (2005),
the firm’s expected output can be rewritten as
e1 + e2 =
1 + ρ
1 + ρ2
e˜+
(1− ρ)2
1 + ρ2
e0 . (6.7)
The derivative of equation (6.7) with respect to e˜ is
∂(e1 + e2)
∂e˜
=
1 + ρ
1 + ρ2
= β∗ . (6.8)
Hence, the principal should pay the agent a bonus of β∗ for each unit of aggregate
output e˜ he expects to observe, as this corresponds to the firm’s expected marginal
gain from measured output. We concentrate on linear compensation schemes,
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where the agent receives an expected wage payment that is composed of a fixed
wage α and a bonus calculated on the basis of the product of β∗ and the observed
output level e˜. Therefore, the expected wage payment for both periods is
E[w(e˜)] = α + β∗ e˜ . (6.9)
Knowing the expected output from equation (6.7), we can now derive the princi-
pal’s expected profit:
E[Π] = e1 + e2 − α− β∗ e˜− c = (1− ρ)
2
1 + ρ2
e0 − α− c , (6.10)
where c ∈ {co, ct}, with co < ct, is the evaluation cost referring to a low or a
high evaluation frequency respectively, i.e. one or two evaluations in a two-period
model. Consequently, if c = co then ρ < 1 and if c = ct then an updating of ρ
occurs and leads to ρ = 1. To derive the agent’s equilibrium effort level, we first
calculate the agent’s effort cost for the provision of an aggregate effort e˜.2
C(e˜) =
(e˜− (1 + ρ)e0)2
2(1 + ρ2)
. (6.11)
Hence, the expected utility for a given effort level e˜ equals
E[U(e˜)] = α+ β∗ e˜− C(e˜) = α + β∗ e˜− (e˜− (1 + ρ)e
0)2
2(1 + ρ2)
. (6.12)
The agents maximize their utility with respect to e˜:
∂E[U(e˜)]
∂e˜
!
= 0⇔ e˜∗ = (1 + ρ2)β∗ + (1 + ρ)e0 ⇔ e˜∗ = (1 + ρ)(1 + e0) . (6.13)
Therefore, the expected output in equilibrium simplifies to
e1 + e2 = 2e
0 +
(1 + ρ)2
1 + ρ2
= 2e0 + (1 + ρ)β . (6.14)
2A detailed derivation of this cost function can be found in the appendix to this chapter.
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Given the optimal level of aggregate effort, an agent’s expected utility is charac-
terized by
E[U(e˜∗)] = α +
1
2
β∗2(1 + ρ2) + β∗(1 + ρ)e0 = α +
(1 + ρ)2
1 + ρ2
(
e0 +
1
2
)
. (6.15)
As the principal is a monopsonist, he will choose α such that U(e˜∗) equals an
agent’s outside option U¯ in equilibrium:
α∗ = U¯ − (1 + ρ)
2
1 + ρ2
(
e0 +
1
2
)
. (6.16)
The expected equilibrium profit is given by
E[Π] =
(1− ρ)2
1 + ρ2
e0 − α∗ − c . (6.17)
Substituting (6.16) into (6.17) leads us to an equilibrium expected profit of the
principal which amounts to
E[Πo∗] = 2e0 +
(1 + ρ)2
2(1 + ρ2)
− U¯ − c (6.18)
for a situation where the principal faces no competitors. To make inferences on the
principal’s choice concerning an optimal evaluation frequency in the two-period
contract, we compare his profit for an optimal one-evaluation contract (E[Πo∗(ρ <
1, co)]) with the profit an optimal two-evaluation contract (E[Π
t∗(ρ = 1, ct)]):3
E[Π(ρ < 1, co)] R E[Π(ρ = 1, ct)]⇔ ∆c R (1− ρ)
2
2(1 + ρ2)
, (6.19)
where ∆c = ct − co is the additional cost from a second evaluation.
3The reader should remember here, that a switch to two evaluations leads to a higher
evaluation cost ct but at the same time it updates ρ to one.
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Proposition 7 If a second evaluation causes an additional cost, the principal
faces a trade-off between offering a one- and offering a two-evaluation contract
to the risk-neutral agent. This trade-off is independent of the agent’s cost param-
eter e0.
Proof. The right-hand side of the inequality in (6.19) is strictly larger than zero
and the left-hand side does not depend on the cost parameter e0.
So, as soon as a second evaluation causes an additional cost, the principal
faces a trade-off between this cost and the disposal over more efficient incentives
due to the information that is gained by another evaluation. The result that
the principal faces a trade-off concerning the evaluation frequency—independent
of the agent’s cost parameter—is complementary to the finding from Chapter 4
where risk-aversion suffices for the existence of a trade-off. Hence, not only when
facing risk-averse agents, the choice of evaluation frequency highly depends on
the particular situation the employer faces.
6.3 Heterogeneity and Symmetric Information
In this section, we will analyze how heterogeneity with respect to the agents’
effort cost impacts the model. In Section 6.2, we assumed that all agents face the
same function (6.3) determining the cost of the provision of a given output level e1
or e2. The higher the parameter e
0 in this function, the lower the agent’s effort
cost. To model heterogeneity, we allow e0 to take two values, i.e. e0 ∈ {eL, eH}
with eL < eH . This gives us two types of agents, an L-agent who faces a higher
effort cost and an H-agent whose effort cost for a given output level is strictly
lower.
Before we consider asymmetric information in Section 6.4, we will interpret
the results from Section 6.2 for heterogenous agents whose types are observable
for the employer. Since the principal can optimally design the contracts offered,
CHAPTER 6. HETEROGENOUS AGENTS 106
as derived in the previous section, this is considered a benchmark case. Equa-
tion (6.13) gives us the intuitive result that an H-agent will produce more than
an L-agent, due to his lower effort cost. Therefore, the output in equation (6.14)
increases in e0. This is also true for the principal’s profit in equation (6.18). The
optimal bonus parameter β∗ is invariant to the cost parameter e0, and we can
see from equation (6.16) that agents with lower effort cost need a lower fixed
wage to participate in the contract. As already mentioned, we can deduce from
the inequality in (6.19) that the principal’s optimal decision on the evaluation
frequency is independent of the agent’s type as long as the principal can observe
the latter to be able to set compensation parameters accordingly. This is an
important result, as it suggests that a differentiation of contracts through the
evaluation frequency—if it occurs—must be caused by asymmetric information.
6.4 Heterogeneity and Asymmetric Information
In the following, we will investigate how the optimal contract parameters and
particularly the optimal evaluation frequency are affected when information about
the type is private to the agent. So, while the agent is fully informed, the principal
only knows the distribution of types within the population of agents he faces. This
population consists of a fraction a representing L-type agents and a fraction (1−a)
of H-type agents. Put differently, a is the probability of a randomly drawn agent
to be of the L-type and (1− a) the respective probability for an H-type. In this
situation, the principal might be interested in screening the agents by proposing
two kinds of contracts such that each worker type selects himself into a specific
contract.
To screen the agents, the principal theoretically can use three instruments
to differentiate contracts. He can offer contracts that differ concerning the fixed
wages, the bonus payments, and the evaluation frequency. It is easy to under-
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stand why differentiating only with respect to one compensation parameter or to
the evaluation frequency, keeping the other contract characteristics identical for
all agents, is useless for screening. Independent of their type, employees strictly
prefer a higher bonus factor, a higher fixed wage, and a higher evaluation fre-
quency to lower ones. Therefore, a contract that successfully screens the agents
must differ in two respects at least.
But should the screening contracts differ in more than two respects? We find
that in an unrestricted model (Section 6.4.1), it is sufficient to use the compensa-
tion parameters to screen the agents under asymmetric information. The optimal
evaluation frequency is unaffected and identical for both types of agents (this is
a logical consequence of the independence result in inequality (6.19)). Only if
we restrict the principal’s possibility to design contracts (Section 6.4.2), e.g. if
he cannot accord different bonuses to employees who have achieved the same
score in an evaluation, the choice of the evaluation frequency will be used for
screening. We will now characterize the different linear pooling and separating
contracts a principal can offer to the agents.4 Having derived the optimal con-
tract parameters for each type of contract, we can compare their profitability in
a next step.
6.4.1 The Unrestricted Model
Pooling Contracts
As he is a monopsonist, one of the principal’s options is to pool the agents using
a single contract with one or two evaluations. We will first solve for the optimal
one-evaluation contract (αoP , βoP ) that attracts both types of workers. In the
following section, the corresponding results for the two-evaluation setup are given.
4Additionally, one could also extend analysis to the possibility of shutting down the L-type.
Here, we chose to focus on contracts which lead to employment of both types of agents. Already,
this leaves us with four relevant cases to compare.
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One Evaluation
An optimal pooling contract with only one evaluation solves the following prob-
lem:
max
αoP ,βoP
aE[ΠoP (eL)] + (1− a)E[ΠoP (eH)] s.t. (6.20)
E[UH(e˜oP∗, αoP , βoP )] ≥ 0 (6.21)
E[UL(e˜oP∗, αoP , βoP )] ≥ 0 . (6.22)
The principal maximizes his expected utility subject to the participation con-
straint of each type of agent and given optimal effort allocation on behalf of the
agents as derived in (6.13). From (6.15), we know the agent’s maximized utility
for a given β. Therefore, we deduce that the conditions in (6.21) and (6.22) equal
E[UH(e˜oP∗, αoP , βoP )] = αoP +
1
2
(βoP )2(1 + ρ2) + βoP (1 + ρ)eH ≥ 0 (6.23)
and
E[UL(e˜oP∗, αoP , βoP )] = αoP +
1
2
(βoP )2(1 + ρ2) + βoP (1 + ρ)eL ≥ 0 (6.24)
respectively. Subtracting (6.24) from (6.23) yields:
βoP (1 + ρ)[eH − eL] ≥ 0 . (6.25)
Hence, the H-agent’s participation constraint in (6.23) is always slack when the
L-agent’s constraint in (6.24) is fulfilled with equality. To formulate the objective
function in (6.20), we need the principal’s expected profit from a single one-
evaluation contract given the agent’s type and optimal effort choice:
E[ΠoP (e˜oP∗, αoP , βoP )] =[
2− (1 + ρ)βoP ] e0 + (1 + ρ)βoP + (1 + ρ2)(βoP )2 − αoP − co . (6.26)
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Consequently, the principal’s aggregate expected profit over the entire population
of agents is given by:
E[ΠoP (a)] = aE[ΠoP (eL)] + (1− a)E[ΠoP (eH)] =[
2− βoP (1 + ρ)] [aeH + (1− a)eL]
+(1 + ρ)βoP − (βoP )2(1 + ρ2)− αoP − co .
(6.27)
The Lagrangian representing the principal’s maximization problem is
L = E[ΠoP (a)]− λ
[
αoP +
1
2
(βoP )2(1 + ρ2) + βoP (1 + ρ)eL
]
. (6.28)
Differentiating (6.28) with respect to αoP , βoP , and λ yields
∂L
∂αoP
= −1− λ != 0⇔ λ = −1 , (6.29)
∂L
∂βoP
= −(1 + ρ)[aeL + (1− a)eH − 1]− 2βoP (1 + ρ2)
−λ[βoP (1 + ρ2) + (1 + ρ)eL] != 0 ,
(6.30)
and
∂L
∂λ
= αoP +
1
2
(βoP )2(1 + ρ2) + βoP (1 + ρ)eL
!
= 0 . (6.31)
Substituting (6.29) into (6.30) gives us the optimal bonus factor
βoP∗ =
1 + ρ
1 + ρ2
q , (6.32)
where q = 1 − (1 − a)(eH − eL). This expression allows to solve for the optimal
fixed wage
αoP∗ = −1
2
(βoP )2(1 + ρ2)− βoP (1 + ρ)eL = − (1 + ρ)
2
2(1 + ρ2)
q[q + 2eL] . (6.33)
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Given the optimal compensation parameters for a pooling contract with one
evaluation, the H-type agent realizes an expected utility of
E[UH(e˜oP∗, αoP∗, βoP∗)] =
(1 + ρ)2
1 + ρ2
q(eH − eL) . (6.34)
Hence, the H-agent’s utility increases in ρ. The utility is hump-shaped in (eH−eL)
with a maximum at (eH − eL) = 12(1−a) . In turn, the expected utility of the L-
agent equals zero in equilibrium. Finally, the principal’s expected profit amounts
to
E[ΠoP∗(a)] = 2[aeL + (1− a)eH ] + (1 + ρ)
2
2(1 + ρ2)
q2 − co . (6.35)
Two Evaluations
The solution for a pooling contract with two evaluations can be derived using
the results of the previous sections. One simply has to update ρ = 1 and replace
the lower value of the evaluation cost co by the higher evaluation cost ct. The
optimal compensation parameters are
βtP∗ = 1− (1− a)(eH − eL) = q (6.36)
and
αtP∗ = −q(q + 2eL) . (6.37)
Given the two-evaluation contract, the H-agent can again extract a positive ex-
pected utility which equals
E[UH(e˜tP∗, αtP∗, βtP∗)] = 2q(eH − eL) , (6.38)
the L-agent’s expected utility is zero, and the principal’s expected profit equals
E[ΠtP∗(a)] = 2[aeL + (1− a)eH ] + q2 − ct . (6.39)
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Separating Contracts with Equal Evaluation Frequencies
Instead of proposing only one type of contract, the employer can address the
heterogeneity of types by offering different contracts at the same time. More
particularly, to be able to screen the agents he can offer a menu of contracts with
each contract consisting of a different vector of contract parameters, possibly
implying different evaluation frequencies. As already mentioned, differentiating
only with respect to one parameter or to the evaluation frequency, keeping the
other contract characteristics identical for all agents, induces no screening. In
this section, we investigate contracts that screen via the differentiation of com-
pensation variables only. In Section 6.4.2, the screening activity of the employer
will additionally allow for different evaluation frequencies within the menu of
contracts.
One Evaluation
In a separating contract, where both agents are evaluated once, the principal’s
expected profit is
E[Πoo(a)] = a[(2− (1 + ρ)βooL )eL + (1 + ρ)βooL − (1 + ρ2)(βooL )2 − αooL − co]
+(1− a)[(2− (1 + ρ)βooH )eH + (1 + ρ)βooH − (1 + ρ2)(βooH )2 − αooH − co] .
(6.40)
He maximizes (6.40) with respect to the H-agent’s incentive and the L-agent’s
participation constraint.
max
αooL ,β
oo
L ,α
oo
H ,β
oo
H
E[Πoo(a)] s.t. (6.41)
E[UH(e˜oo∗, αooH , β
oo
H )] ≥ E[UH(e˜oo∗, αooL , βooL )] (6.42)
E[UL(e˜oo∗, αooL , β
oo
L )] ≥ 0 . (6.43)
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For a contract to be accepted by L-agents, the optimal compensation parameters
are
αoo∗L = −
(1 + ρ)2
1 + ρ2
[
1
2
q¯2 + q¯eL
]
(6.44)
and
βoo∗L =
(1 + ρ)
1 + ρ2
q¯ , (6.45)
where q¯ = 1− 1−a
a
(eH − eL). A contract that offers a fixed compensation of
αoo∗H =
(1 + ρ)2
1 + ρ2
[
q¯(eH − eL)− 1
2
− eH
]
(6.46)
and a bonus factor of
βoo∗H =
(1 + ρ)
1 + ρ2
(6.47)
will only be accepted by H-agents. A comparison with equation (6.8) shows that
the H-type is provided with efficient incentives in this menu of contracts. The
employer is able to screen the agents and makes an expected profit of
E[Πoo∗(a)] = 2[aeL + (1− a)eH ] + (1 + ρ)
2
2(1 + ρ2)
[aq¯2 + (1− a)]− co . (6.48)
The H-agent can realize an expected utility of
E[UH(e˜oo∗, αoo∗H , β
oo∗
H )] =
(1 + ρ)2
1 + ρ2
q(eH − eL) (6.49)
by choosing the contract containing αoo∗H , β
oo∗
H , and one evaluation. The L-agent
can only realize a utility of zero with the contract designed for him. Choosing
the H-type’s contract would leave him with a negative expected utility.
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Two Evaluations
Once the principal decides to screen via a two-evaluation contract, his expected
payoff is
E[Πtt(a)] = a[2(1− βttL )(βttL + eL)− αttL]
+ (1− a)[2(1− βttH)(βttH + eH)− αttH ]− ct .
(6.50)
The optimal compensation parameters for the L-agent’s contract are
αtt∗L = −q¯2 − 2q¯eL (6.51)
and
βtt∗L = q¯ . (6.52)
Only H-agents will choose a contract with the compensation parameters
αtt∗H = 2q¯(eH − eL)− 1− 2eH (6.53)
and
βtt∗H = 1 . (6.54)
So, as in the previous section, the H-agent is provided with efficient incentives.
His expected utility equals
E[UH(e˜oo∗, αoo∗H , β
oo∗
H )] =
(1 + ρ)2
1 + ρ2
q(eH − eL) . (6.55)
Screening the agents is possible and it generates an expected profit of
E[Πtt∗(a)] = 2[aeL + (1− a)eH ] + aq¯2 −+(1− a)− ct . (6.56)
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Separating Contracts with Unequal Evaluation Frequencies
As our particular interest is the choice of the evaluation frequency, we are con-
cerned with the outcome of a contract where the principal screens the agents by
offering contracts with different evaluation frequencies. Compensation parame-
ters and the evaluation frequency are highly interlinked, so obviously, a screening
by the evaluation frequency will—if this is possible—additionally imply an adjust-
ment of the compensation variables to the number of evaluations. Specifically, the
principal can either differentiate by evaluating the L-agent once and the H-agent
twice, or he can decide to do the inverse.
One and Two Evaluations
When the L-type opts into a contract with one evaluation and the H-type chooses
the contract regime in which he is evaluated twice, the employer’s expected profit,
given optimal effort choice, is characterized by
E[Πot(a)] = a[(2− (1 + ρ)βotL )eL + (1 + ρ)βotL − (1 + ρ2)(βotL )2 − αotL − co]
+(1− a)[2(1− βotH )(βotH + eH)− αotH − ct] .
(6.57)
Maximizing (6.57) subject to both, the agents’ participation and incentive com-
patibility constraints, yields the optimal compensation parameters. For the L-
agent’s contract they equal
αot∗L = −
(
2(1 + ρ)2q
a(1− ρ)2 + (1 + ρ)2
)
·
(
(1 + ρ2)q
a(1− ρ)2 + (1 + ρ)2 + eL
)
(6.58)
and
βot∗L =
2(1 + ρ)q
a(1− ρ)2 + (1 + ρ)2 . (6.59)
H-types will choose a contract with the parameters
αot∗H = −
(
(1 + ρ)2q
a(1− ρ)2 + (1 + ρ)2
)
·
(
(1 + ρ)2q
a(1− ρ)2 + (1 + ρ)2 + 2eL
)
(6.60)
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and
βot∗H =
(1 + ρ)2q
a(1− ρ)2 + (1 + ρ)2 . (6.61)
The employer can screen the agents by offering these two contracts and makes an
expected profit of
E[Πot∗(a)] = 2[aeL + (1− a)eH ]+
(1+ρ)2q2
a(1−ρ)2+(1+ρ)2 − aco − (1− a)ct .
(6.62)
The H-agents receives a utility of
UH(e˜ot∗, αot∗H , β
ot∗
H ) =
2(1 + ρ)2q
a(1− ρ)2 + (1 + ρ)2 (eH − eL) . (6.63)
Two and One Evaluations
To complete our analysis, we will now derive the optimal contract parameters for
a contract where the L-agent chooses a contract with two evaluations and the
H-agent a contract with only one evaluation. An employer who offers this type
of contract, will make an expected profit of
E[Πto(a)] = a[2(1− βtoL )(βtoL + eL)− αtoL − ct]
+ (1− a)[(2− (1 + ρ)βtoH)eH + (1 + ρ)βtoH ]
− (1− a)[(1 + ρ2)(βtoH)2 + αtoH + co] .
(6.64)
Now, the optimal compensation parameters for the L-agent’s contract are
αto∗L = −
(
(1 + ρ)2q
2(1 + ρ2)− a(1− ρ)2
)
·
(
(1 + ρ)2q
2(1 + ρ2)− a(1− ρ)2 + 2eL
)
(6.65)
and
βto∗L =
(1 + ρ)2q
2(1 + ρ2)− a(1− ρ)2 . (6.66)
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H-agents select a one-evaluation contract with the parameters
αto∗H = −
(
2(1 + ρ)2q
2(1 + ρ2)− a(1− ρ)2
)
·
(
(1 + ρ2)q
2(1 + ρ2)− a(1− ρ)2 + eL
)
(6.67)
and
βto∗H =
2(1 + ρ)q
2(1 + ρ2)− a(1− ρ)2 . (6.68)
The employer can screen the agents by offering these two contracts and makes an
expected profit of
E[Πto∗(a)] = 2[aeL + (1− a)eH ] +
(1+ρ)2q2
2(1+ρ2)−a(1−ρ)2 − act − (1− a)co .
(6.69)
Given this optimal contract, the H-agent’s utility amounts to
E[UH(e˜to∗, αto∗H , β
to∗
H )] =
2(1 + ρ)2q
2(1 + ρ2)− a(1− ρ)2 (eH − eL) . (6.70)
Results
By analyzing the results of the preceding sections, we find that the two pooling
contracts are always dominated by the corresponding contracts that screen via
the compensation parameters only. These contracts give optimal incentives to
the H-agent and leave him with a positive rent. Comparing profits of both types
of contract for one and two evaluations yields
E[ΠoP∗(a)− Πoo∗(a)] < 0⇔ − (1 + ρ)
2
2(1 + ρ2)
(1− a)3
a
(eH − eL)2 < 0 (6.71)
and
E[ΠtP∗(a)− Πtt∗(a)] < 0⇔ −(1− a)
3
a
(eH − eL)2 < 0 (6.72)
respectively.
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Proposition 8 A principal will never offer a pooling contract when he can dif-
ferentiate agents using the compensation parameters and evaluation frequency.
The proof directly follows from equations (6.71) and (6.72).
Whilst the exclusion of pooling contracts is a clear-cut result, a principal’s
decision between the different separating contracts depends on the parametriza-
tion of the model. For the comparison between the screening contract with one
evaluation and the screening contract with two evaluations, we get
E[Πoo∗(a)− Πtt∗(a)] R 0⇔ (1− ρ
2)
2(1 + ρ2)
[(1− a) + aq¯2] Q ct − co . (6.73)
The respective profit differential when comparing this option with a screening
contract that evaluates L-agents once and H-agents twice is
E[Πoo∗(a)− Πot∗(a)] R 0⇔
(1+ρ2)
2(1+ρ2)
[(1− a) + aq¯2]− (1+ρ)2q2
a(1−ρ)2+(1+ρ)2 R (1− a)(co − ct) .
(6.74)
The comparison with the reverse choice of evaluation frequency leads us to
E[Πoo∗(a)− Πto∗(a)] R 0⇔
(1+ρ2)
2(1+ρ2)
[(1− a) + aq¯2]− (1+ρ)2q2
2(1+ρ2)−a(1−ρ)2 R a(co − ct) .
(6.75)
The profit differential for a contract that screens, whilst all agents are evaluated
twice, and a contract that evaluates L-agents once and H-agents twice, leads us
to the following inequality
E[Πtt∗(a)− Πot∗(a)] R 0⇔
aq¯2 + (1− a)− (1+ρ)2q2
a(1−ρ)2+(1+ρ)2 ) R a(ct − co) .
(6.76)
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Furthermore, the behavior of the differential for this contract and a contract that
evaluates L-agents twice and H-agents once can be described as
E[Πtt∗(a)− Πto∗(a)] R 0⇔
aq¯2 + (1− a)− (1+ρ)2q2
2(1+ρ2)−a(1−ρ)2 ) R (1− a)(ct − co) .
(6.77)
Finally, the trade-off between the two contracts which differentiate via evaluation
frequency is characterized by
E[Πto∗(a)− Πot∗(a)] R 0⇔
(1+ρ)2(1−ρ)2q2(1−2a)
(2(1+ρ2)−a(1−ρ)2)(a(1−ρ)2+(1+ρ)2) R (ct − co)(1− 2a) .
(6.78)
It is easy to see that profits are equal, when the shares of L- and H-agents are
equal, i.e. a = 0.5.
As the inequalities (6.71) to (6.78) crucially depend on the parametrization of
the model, figures 6.1 to 6.5 visualize the profits generated by different contract
choices for several values of eH , eL, co, and ct, or, to be more precise, for values
of the relevant parameter differences eH − eL and ct − co.5 The figures show
variations of profit with respect to the share of L-agents, which is a, and ρ, the
memory parameter of the principal.
For all parameterizations, depending on the values of a and ρ, either one-
evaluation or two-evaluation screening contracts are being offered by the principal.
Contracts screening via evaluation frequency are always dominated by one of the
former screening contracts using only one evaluation frequency for both agents.
This is intuitive as the principal can successfully screen agents via compensation
parameters while choosing the optimal evaluation frequency independently of his
screening activity. Anyhow, as we can see in figures 6.2 and 6.3 the frequency that
is chosen in the screening contract still depends on the distribution of types in
5The different parameterizations are chosen in a ”sensitive” way, i.e. we have chosen para-
meterizations that illustrate particularly well the trade-offs that can occur in the model. Also,
the choice of eH − eL has been made such, that negative bonus payments can be excluded with
certainty.
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Figure 6.1: Screening Profits (Parametrization: eH − eL = 0.1, ct − co = 1)
the population. When the share of L-agents a is rather low, two evaluations pay
off more than when only few H-agents are employed. Furthermore, the graphics
suggest that if the memory parameter ρ impacts the principal’s contract choice it
does so in only one way: Higher values of ρ make one-evaluation contracts more
attractive, which is a reasonable result.
For, so to say, ”extreme” parameterizations, the choice of evaluation frequency
becomes independent of a and ρ (figures 6.1 and 6.5). For instance, when the
heterogeneity is low but additional evaluations are costly (Figure 6.1), only one-
evaluation screening contracts will be offered. We see that with lower values of
ct − co, contracts with more evaluations become more profitable. When eH − eL
and ct − co are equal (Figures 6.2 and 6.3), lower parameter values of the former
CHAPTER 6. HETEROGENOUS AGENTS 120
Figure 6.2: Screening Profits (Parametrization: eH − eL = 1, ct − co = 1)
make two-evaluation screening contracts relatively more attractive for low values
of ρ. Reducing the additional cost of an evaluation to a value close to zero
makes the two-evaluation screening contracts the only ones being offered for all
values of a and ρ (Figure 6.5). Altogether, we can state that there are only two
remaining contract options to be considered by the principal. He will always
screen the heterogenous agents using solely the compensation parameters.
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Figure 6.3: Screening Profits (Parametrization: eH − eL = 0.1, ct − co = 0.1)
6.4.2 Restriction to Equal Bonus Parameters
Unequal Evaluation Frequencies
In the previous discussion of results, it has turned out that screening contracts
differentiating with respect to all compensation variables are dominated by con-
tracts that screen by the use of the compensation parameters only. The reason for
this is that the principal can already screen the agents by adjusting compensation
and he will therefore choose only one optimal evaluation frequency which is iden-
tical for both types of agents. So screening with respect to evaluation frequency
is not optimal for the principal in this setup. But what would happen if ratings
and bonus payments were public? For instance, it is plausible to think that for
CHAPTER 6. HETEROGENOUS AGENTS 122
Figure 6.4: Screening Profits (Parametrization: eH − eL = 1, ct − co = 0.01)
reasons of equity, agents cannot be paid a lower bonus than a peer for having
rendered identical performance. In the following two sections, we will therefore
analyze work contracts where a differentiation can be made according to the fixed
wage as well as according to the evaluation frequency but for equal performance,
bonuses must be the same for all agents.
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Figure 6.5: Screening Profits (Parametrization: eH − eL = 1, ct − co = 0.0001)
One and Two Evaluations
The principal’s expected profit from a screening contract with one evaluation for
the L-type and two evaluations for the H-type now is characterized by
E[Πˆot(a)] = a[(2− (1 + ρ)βˆot)eL + (1 + ρ)βˆot − (1 + ρ2)(βˆot)2 − αˆotL − co]
+(1− a)[2(1− βˆot)(βˆot + eH)− αˆotH − ct] .
(6.79)
Note that the bonus parameter βˆot now is set equal for both types of agents.
Maximizing (6.79) subject to both, the agents’ participation and incentive com-
patibility constraints, yields the optimal compensation parameters. The optimal
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bonus parameter for both contracts is
βˆot∗ =
2− a(1− ρ)− (1 + ρ)(1− a)(eH − eL)
2− a(1− ρ2) . (6.80)
L-agents will be willing to choose the one-evaluation contract if the fixed wage
offered equals
αˆot∗L = −1/2(1 + p2)(βˆot∗)2 − (1 + p)βˆot∗eL . (6.81)
The optimal fixed wage component in the two-evaluation contract designated to
the H-types is
αˆot∗H = −(βˆot∗)2 − 2eH βˆot∗ + (1 + p)βˆot∗(eH − eL) . (6.82)
The employer’s expected profit from this menu of contracts amounts to
E[Πˆot∗(a)] = 2[aeH + (1− a)eL]+
[2−a(1−ρ)−(1+ρ)(1−a)(eH−eL)]2
2[2−a(1−p2)] − aco − (1− a)ct .
(6.83)
Whereas the H-agents receive a utility of
UH(e˜ot∗, αˆot∗H , βˆ
ot∗) = βˆot∗(1 + ρ)(eH − eL) , (6.84)
the utility of the L-agents is zero.
Two and One Evaluations
Analogously to the previous section, we derive the optimal contract parameters
for a contract where the L-agent is evaluated twice and the H-agent only once.
The employer’s expected profit will be
E[Πˆto(a)] = a[2(1− βˆto)(βˆto + eL)− αˆtoL − ct]
+(1− a)[(2− (1 + ρ)βˆto)eH + (1 + ρ)βˆto − (1 + ρ2)(βˆto)2 − αˆtoH − co] .
(6.85)
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The optimal bonus parameter solving the principal’s maximization problem is
βˆto∗ =
a(1− ρ) + (1 + ρ)− 2(1− a)(eH − eL)
a(1− ρ2) + (1 + ρ2) . (6.86)
L-agents are willing to be evaluated twice if the fixed compensation component
equals
αˆto∗L = −(βˆto∗)2 − 2eLβˆto∗ (6.87)
and H-agents prefer to be evaluated only once receiving a fixed wage of
αˆto∗H = −1/2(1 + ρ2)(βˆto∗)2 − (1 + ρ)βˆto∗eH + 2βˆto∗(eH − eL) . (6.88)
The employer can screen the agents by offering these two contracts and makes an
expected profit of
E[Πˆto∗(a)] = 2[aeH + (1− a)eL] +
[a(1−ρ)+(1+ρ)−2(1−a)(eH−eL)]2
2[a(1−ρ2)+(1+ρ2)] − act − (1− a)co .
(6.89)
Given this optimal contract, the H-agent’s utility amounts to
E[UH(e˜to∗, αˆto∗, βˆto∗H )] = 2βˆ
to∗(eH − eL) . (6.90)
Results
To identify the most profitable contract in a situation with equal bonus parame-
ters for both types of agents we must compare several outcomes: Those of the two
screening contracts derived in the previous section (equations (6.83) and (6.89))
and those of the two pooling contracts (equations (6.35) and (6.35)). In contrast
to the results where a differentiation with respect to bonus parameters is possible,
we find that screening via the choice of evaluation frequency can now be optimal.
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Comparing profits from the two pooling contracts yields
E[ΠoP∗(a)− ΠtP∗(a)] R 0⇔ − (1− ρ)
2
2(1 + ρ2)
q2 R co − ct . (6.91)
The profit from the pooling contract with one evaluation compared to those from
the two screening contracts yields the inequalities
E[ΠoP∗(a)− Πˆot∗(a)] R 0 ⇔
(1+ρ)2
2(1+ρ2)
q2 − [2−a(1−ρ)−(1+ρ)(1−a)(eH−eL)]2
2[2−a(1−ρ2)] R (1− a)(co − ct)
(6.92)
and
E[ΠoP∗(a)− Πˆto∗(a)] R 0 ⇔
(1+ρ)2
2(1+ρ2)
q2 − [a(1−ρ)+(1+ρ)−2(1−a)(eH−eL)]2
2[a(1−ρ2)+(1+ρ2)] R a(co − ct) .
(6.93)
Pooling with two evaluations dominates the screening contracts when the left-
hand side of the following two inequalities outbalances the respective right-hand
side:
E[ΠtP∗(a)− Πˆot∗(a)] R 0 ⇔
q2 − [2−a(1−ρ)−(1+ρ)(1−a)(eH−eL)]2
2[2−a(1−ρ2)] R a(ct − co) ,
(6.94)
E[ΠtP∗(a)− Πˆto∗(a)] R 0 ⇔
q2 − [a(1−ρ)+(1+ρ)−2(1−a)(eH−eL)]2
2[a(1−ρ2)+(1+ρ2)] R (1− a)(ct − co) .
(6.95)
Again, we recur to a parametrization to illustrate changes of the model out-
come with respect to variations of the parameter set. To allow a comparison with
the results in a situation where a differentiation of all choice parameters is pos-
sible, the following figures are based on the same parametrization as Figures 6.1
to 6.5.
In contrast to the parameterizations in Section 6.4.1, Figures 6.6 to 6.10 in-
dicate that, in the restricted model version, all four possible contract regimes
can be optimal. The choice of the principal varies in all parameters. Especially,
variations in a and ρ are multifaceted in this modified setup. Figure 6.9 illus-
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Figure 6.6: Pooling and Screening Profits (Parametrization: eH − eL = 0.1,
ct − co = 1)
trates this particularly well. Depending on a and ρ, four different options can
be optimal with this specific parametrization. Screening the agents with respect
to evaluation frequency is favorable when there are relatively few L-agents, i.e.
when a is low (Figures 6.7 to 6.10). Otherwise, pooling contracts will be chosen.
Increases in the memory parameter ρ lower the benefit from more evaluations
and, therefore, they can lower the number of evaluations whenever they induce a
change from a screening to a pooling contract. A switch of the screening contracts
is also possible due to a change in ρ (see Figure 6.7, 6.9, and 6.10).
Variations in evaluation cost clearly affect the outcome. For a very high cost
of an additional evaluation, the outcome is identical to the one in the unre-
stricted model. Figure 6.6 indicates that only contracts with one evaluation will
be chosen. The difference is that, in the restricted model this is a pooling con-
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Figure 6.7: Pooling and Screening Profits (Parametrization: eH − eL = 1,
ct − co = 1)
tract, whereas, in Section 6.4.1, a screening contract with one evaluation for both
agents was feasible and optimal. When additional evaluations are relatively cheap
compared to the degree of heterogeneity eH− eL (Figure 6.10), not all agents will
be evaluated twice. This stands in contrast to Section 6.4.1 as the principal now
uses the differentiation with respect to evaluation frequency to screen the agents.
We can resume that, given the restriction of the choice of the bonus factor, all
four remaining contract options must be considered by the principal. Reducing
the number of instruments for differentiation aggravates the principal’s decision
problem. He faces a trade-off between optimal screening on the one hand and
optimal evaluation frequency on the other hand.
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Figure 6.8: Pooling and Screening Profits (Parametrization: eH − eL = 0.1,
ct − co = 0.1)
6.5 Conclusion
We have proposed a model of performance-based contracts in the presence of
asymmetric information concerning agents’ productivity and under the assump-
tion of bounded memory on behalf of the principal who conducts evaluations.
Within different sets of feasible contracts, we have formalized optimal pooling
and separating contracts.
Under symmetric information, the choice of the optimal evaluation frequency
is independent of the agent’s type. Though agents are risk-neutral, we do not
confirm the result from Chapter 3 that it is never optimal for the principal to
evaluate more often than at the end of the contracting period. The difference in
the results is caused by the quadratic effort cost, adapted from Moen and Rose´n
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Figure 6.9: Pooling and Screening Profits (Parametrization: eH − eL = 1,
ct − co = 0.01)
(2005). Whereas, in Chapters 3 and 4, investing in first-period effort is always
as costly to the agent as investing in second-period effort, no matter the current
level of investment, this is not true in a setup with quadratic effort cost.
Furthermore, we find that screening by the use of different evaluation fre-
quencies is only worthwhile when other screening possibilities are not available.
If agents can be screened by the help of compensation parameters, the opti-
mal choice of evaluation frequency is the same as under symmetric information.
Hence, both agents will be evaluated at the same frequency due to the indepen-
dence of the optimal evaluation frequency from the type of agent. As opposed to
a setup with homogenous agents, the composition of the population of workers
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Figure 6.10: Pooling and Screening Profits (Parametrization: eH − eL = 1,
ct − co = 0.0001)
has an impact on optimal evaluation frequency. The more L-types are present in
the work force, the less evaluations should be conducted. The optimal evaluation
frequency will only be chosen differently for the two types if there are no other
screening tools at hand which can be used at an acceptable cost. If paying agents
different bonuses for the same performance causes feelings of inequity within a
work force and if this again is costly due to a negative effect on motivation, a
differentiation with respect to bonus payments actually might be impossible.
This chapter gives further theoretical foundations for the choice of the fre-
quency of employee evaluations. It can explain why evaluation frequency might
differ between units of a firm or between organizations but maybe not between
employees performing similar tasks. Anecdotic evidence already suggests, that for
instance consultants—who are a good example for highly qualified employees—are
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being evaluated more often compared to other business professionals. However,
we have not yet observed a variation of evaluation frequency within one group of
employees doing a similar job, which is rather in line with our results. An empir-
ical study of evaluation frequency would be helpful for a further understanding
of this issue. It could help to investigate whether indirect indicators for produc-
tivity such as skill level and the position within an organization can successfully
explain some of the variation in the practiced evaluation frequency.
6.6 Appendix
6.6.1 Derivation of the Aggregate Cost Function
To derive the cost function in equation (6.11) we first expand the expected value
of (6.2) by −(1 + ρ)e0:
e˜− (1 + ρ)e0 = ρe1 + e2 − (1 + ρ)e0 (6.96)
⇔ e˜− (1 + ρ)e0 = ρ(e1 − e0) + e2 − e0 .
Equation (6.6) allows us to substitute e2−e0 by 1ρ(e1−e0). Hence, we can simplify
the right-hand side of (6.96) as follows:
1 + ρ2
ρ
(e1 − e0) = e˜− (1 + ρ)e0 (6.97)
⇔ e1 − e0 = ρ
1 + ρ2
(e˜− (1 + ρ)e0) .
Substituting (6.6) into (6.97) gives us
e1 − e0 = 1
1 + ρ2
(e˜− (1 + ρ)e0) . (6.98)
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Substituting (6.97) and (6.98) into the cost function from (6.3) yields
C(e˜) =
1
2
(e1 − e0)2 + 1
2
(e2 − e0)2 (6.99)
=
1
2
[
ρ
1 + ρ2
(e˜− (1 + ρ)e0)
]2
+
1
2
[
1
1 + ρ2
(e˜− (1 + ρ)e0)
]2
=
(e˜− (1 + ρ)e0)2
2(1 + ρ2)
.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Summary
This work has discussed the role of the frequency with which performance evalua-
tions take place. In a situation where the quality of information is decreasing over
time—we explained this with the imperfectness of human memory—we analyzed
the impact of several influential factors such as risk attitudes, wealth, or hetero-
geneity with respect to productivity on the conduct of evaluations.
In Chapter 3, we approached the issue in a setup where agents are risk-neutral
or wealth-constrained. We found that the principal will not make use of more
frequent evaluations to counterbalance his forgetfulness when the agent’s wealth
is unbounded. The consideration of wealth-constrained agents weakens this out-
come and we established that the optimal evaluation frequency increases with
the degree of forgetfulness, with falling fixed cost of the evaluation, and with the
tightness of the agent’s wealth constraint. As a main result of Chapter 4, the in-
troduction of risk aversion on the part of the agent leads to a trade-off concerning
the principal’s choice of evaluation frequency. Though they are costly, in a model
with risk aversion, more evaluations can even enhance efficiency through the eli-
mination of risk within the evaluation process. The extension to a duopoly setup
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presented in Chapter 5 does not change the decision on evaluation frequency.
Possibly, a competitive advantage for the principal who has the better memory
capacity emerges. His share of the surplus increases the more the competitor
forgets.
In the presence of heterogeneity concerning agents’ productivity (Chapter 6)
the optimal evaluation frequency potentially varies with the distribution of types
in the population of agents. Under symmetric information, the choice regarding
the optimal evaluation frequency is independent of the agent’s type. In this
chapter, we also introduced a quadratic cost function for the effort exertion of
agents and found that this creates a trade-off concerning the evaluation frequency,
even though agents are assumed to be risk-neutral. This, of course, shows that the
result obtained in Chapter 3, i.e. that increasing evaluation frequency is wasteful
when the agents are risk-neutral, only holds under very particular assumptions.
With asymmetric information, we found that screening by the use of different
evaluation frequencies is worthwhile if, and only if, other screening possibilities
are not available. This suggests that sorting employees by different evaluation
frequencies should only be observed if restrictions concerning the design of labor
contracts are at work. For example, the transparency of a bonus system can
prevent the differentiation of bonus payments within a work force because of
equity considerations.
Our first results suggested that evaluations are a necessary evil and should be
avoided as long as it is possible to do so. The setup generating this result was a
puristic one: no risk aversion, linear effort cost, and agents who are homogenous
in productivity and who face no wealth constraint. The following modifications
all come along with deviations from and restrictions to this simple framework and
the results they produce all have one thing in common. With rising complexity of
the situation that is modeled, the decision on the optimal contract design, speci-
fically the one on the optimal evaluation frequency, also becomes more complex.
Common sense tells us that individuals are risk-averse, we know that they do
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face wealth constraints and that labor forces are heterogenous with respect to
productivity. As already addressed in the introduction, a model of frequency de-
cisions cannot yield a magic formula allowing to calculate the optimal evaluation
frequency for specific situations. However, what the models we presented can do
is to show that the choice of evaluation frequency within an organization should
be made thoroughly, taking into account the specific environment.
Alternative Interpretations
Throughout the text, we have argued that the quality of information decreases
over time and this is caused by the bounded capacity of the supervisor’s memory.
But our model can be applied to any situation where investment into measure-
ment technology, a technology straightening measurement distortions, leads to
more precise performance information.
The loss of information could as well be induced by the turnover of the super-
visors. If an employee’s superior quits the firm, the information he has gathered
on his subordinate’s performance will be lost. So more frequent evaluations, do-
cumenting the judgment, assure that this information stays within the firm and
will be used for the determination of the bonus. Another possibility is interpre-
ting the memory parameter as a discount factor, depreciating the value of the
output as it has been done in Section 3.5. In the following section, we will also
discuss evaluations in the light of hyperbolic discounting.
Different Functions of Evaluations
Coming back to the example of evaluations in the course of a Ph.D. program,
two more important aspects concerning evaluation frequency should be consi-
dered. First of all, it is important to note that evaluations have an impact on
two dimensions: past and future. In our setup, we only discussed the backward-
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oriented component of evaluations, but in addition, the frequency of their conduct
plays a future-oriented role. If the feedback given in an evaluation is a means
for players to learn, more evaluations should accelerate such a learning process.
Not only individuals can learn about their fit for the current job or their overall
ability (as modeled in Lazear; 1990), feedback also has a value for the firm, as
individuals can optimize the allocation of effort to tasks more quickly, thanks to
the information gained from the feedback process. This mechanism becomes par-
ticularly evident for the example of Ph.D. students. If their supervisor evaluates
them at a frequent rate, this will allow students to identify promising aspects for
research at an early stage, preventing them from putting too much effort into
directions that are actually on the wrong track.
A further aspect of the rate at which evaluations take place is a motivational
one that goes beyond the bonus payment as such. When individuals know that an
evaluation is approaching, this will usually motivate them, boosting performance
just before the review. This all too human behavior is called procrastination.
In the individual perception, working hard from tomorrow on is preferable to
starting to work hard today. Again, the Ph.D. student is our real life example
par excellence. If the only evaluation he expects to receive is the assessment of
his thesis in one, two, or more years, it might be quite difficult to continually
work on his research from the start. A doctoral program that schedules regular
workshops, during which the first drafts of the thesis are discussed and evaluated
by the supervisor, will give a stronger motivation to produce results already at
an early stage.
Who Wants Frequent Evaluations?
In general, employees as well as students dislike evaluations, whereas it is common
belief that supervisors and teachers are fond of them. But the present work
suggests that this view is too simplistic. There are many reasons why those
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who are evaluated should wish to be evaluated even more often. They receive
important information about their actual performance which can help them to
do an even better job in the future. Furthermore, doing the evaluation close
to the time span in which the work actually has been done will lead to a more
precise judgment, and disagreements can probably be settled more easily when
the evaluation is close to the situation in question. When the labor force of
an organization is relatively mobile, more evaluations maintain the quality of
performance information, as the information loss due to turnover is lower. Last
but not least, individuals who are procrastinators—and who are unhappy about
this—should appreciate an increased number of evaluations.
For employers, as well as teachers and professors, evaluations first of all mean
one thing: work. The benefits of evaluations mainly are indirect: an increased
motivation of the supervised to perform, a reduction of the risk imposed on them,
and an enhanced learning process. So, frequent evaluations should rather be a
sign of an employer’s attractiveness than a blemish. The results from Chapter 6
and also observations of business practice, indicate that employers do not want
to increase evaluation frequency for the use of screening.
Future Research Issues
All in all, there have been very few attempts to explain variations of the frequency
of certain actions in economic behavior. This is particularly true for the study of
the choice of evaluation frequency of employees. This work is only another step
towards a proper understanding of the role of evaluations and their potential
within firms and other organizations. It would be of further interest to study the
consequences of combining the different models presented in Chapters 3 to 6 with
the approach proposed by Lazear (1990). This could be particularly fruitful, as
the literature on evaluations is, in a certain sense, the link between the literature
on performance pay and the research on feedback. Furthermore, an empirical
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verification, particularly of whether evaluations are used for information trans-
mission in the sense of a feedback or rather for the improvement of the quality of
performance information, would be of great interest. This would help to indicate
in how far evaluations are used to enhance learning and how much they account
for incentives provided in a firm.
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